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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this research is to study the relationship between various aspects 
of corporate bonds liquidity , transaction costs and trading activity, and their perceived 
credit quality as measured by credit ratings. For debt securities, Credit quality and 
liquidity are perhaps the most important factors that affect the investors’ decisions 
whether to trade or hold these assets on their portfolio, as several theoretical and 
empirical studies identify these factors as key components of bonds yield spreads. 
However, the interaction and relationship between these two characteristics is not 
sufficiently addressed in the literature. From the investors’ perspective, it is beneficial 
to know whether they face a tradeoff between credit quality and liquidity or if both 
desirable features move in the same direction. We use more than twelve years of 
Enhanced TRACE data from 2002 to 2014 to analyze the liquidity of corporate bonds 
both cross-sectionally across credit ratings and intertemporally around credit rating 
changes. 
The first manuscript studies the relationship between corporate bonds’ credit risk 
and their market liquidity, and the dynamics of this relationship over the period from 
2002 to 2014. Unlike the implication of theoretical models, our findings do not 
empirically support a monotonically positive relation between credit risk and 
transaction costs. Instead, we find an inverted U-shaped relationship where bonds with 
ratings near the Investment grade/ High yield boundary have the largest transaction 
costs (lowest liquidity) after controlling for other relevant factors. One explanation for 
this finding is that bond dealers behave more as brokers in speculative grade bonds 
and are reluctant to enter overnight positions in these risky securities, unless they find 
 the other side of the trade. This kind of dealers behavior potentially reduces the 
transaction costs of lower rated bond, as captured by bid-ask spreads, to only reflect 
the cost of searching for counterparty rather than inventory or adverse selection risks, 
and may be even more pronounced during distressed market conditions due to more 
capital constrains and less funding liquidity. Consistent with this explanation, using a 
Markov Switching time series model, we find that while bid-ask spreads significantly 
increase for investment grade bonds during the crisis, they stay invariant for junk 
bonds.  
The second essay expands this investigation to examine the impact of rating 
changes on corporate bonds’ liquidity around the rating change announcements using 
an event study methodology. Many institutional investors such as insurance companies 
or pension funds are prohibited by regulations from investing substantial portion of 
their portfolios in risky bonds. Hence, the rating changes that move the bonds out of 
the investment grade category can elicit selling pressure or even fire sale of the fallen 
angels. Beyond just the investment grade issue, prudential regulators also have scoring 
algorithms that require more capital to be held as ratings fall. Our findings suggest an 
abnormal decrease in liquidity following the rating downgrades with more severe 
impact for downgrades that move the bond from investment grade to high yield 
category. Consistent with the prior findings, investment grade bonds liquidity is more 
sensitive to rating downgrades and for bonds that are already risky, further 
downgrades doesn’t seem to affect their liquidity and transaction costs significantly. 
We also find that bond and issuer characteristics like issue size and industry group 
affect the liquidity conditions around rating events.    
 The third essay reviews the theoretical as well as empirical literature on the 
impact of liquidity on corporate bonds prices and yield spreads.  
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ABSTRACT 
This paper studies the relationship between corporate bonds’ credit risk and their 
market liquidity, as well as the dynamics of this relationship from 2002 to 2014. 
Unlike the implication of theoretical models, our findings do not empirically support a 
monotonically positive relation between credit risk and transaction costs. Instead, we 
find an inverted U-shaped relationship where bonds with ratings near the investment 
grade/ high yield boundary have the largest transaction costs (lowest liquidity) after 
controlling for other relevant factors. One explanation is that bond dealers behave 
more as brokers in speculative grade bonds and are reluctant to enter overnight 
positions in these risky securities, unless they find the other side of the trade, as 
suggested in Goldstein and Hotchkiss (2017). This type of dealer behavior potentially 
reduces the transaction costs of lower rated bond, as captured by bid-ask spreads, to 
only reflect the cost of searching for counterparty rather than inventory or adverse 
selection risks, and may be even more pronounced during distressed market conditions 
due to more capital constrains and less funding liquidity. Consistent with this 
explanation, using a Markov Switching time series model, we find that where bid-ask 
spreads significantly increase for investment grade bonds during the crisis, they stay 
invariant for junk bonds.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper studies the relationship between corporate bonds’ trading costs and 
perceived credit quality as measured by their credit ratings. The nationally recognized 
statistical rating organizations (NRSRO’s) such as Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s 
have been rating corporate bonds for over a century, and a broad array of contractual 
and regulatory requirements are tightly connected to the ratings they provide. 
Although at times the incentives and ability of rating agencies to provide accurate and 
timely information have been called into question, credit ratings are widely used by 
investors and regulators alike as proxy for credit risk. In addition, different regulations 
use credit ratings to restrict investment or allocate risk: institutional investors such as 
insurance companies and pension funds are prohibited from investing significant 
proportion of their portfolio in high yield bonds, and risk based capital requirements 
for banks and other financial intermediaries are also determined based on credit 
ratings. As a result, the potential pool of investors, their trading frequency and strategy 
may vary across credit ratings.  This variation may affect dealers’ trading behavior, 
and ultimately liquidity and transaction costs for corporate bonds across different 
rating categories.  
Traditional market microstructure models generally imply wider bid-ask spreads 
for lower rated bonds, conditional on certain assumptions. For example, inventory 
models relate bid-ask spreads to dealers’ inventory risk which increases with the 
degree of asset price movements as well as the length of time the asset is kept in 
inventory (Stoll, 1978; Ho 1981; Ho and Stoll, 1983; Grossman and Miller, 1988; 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2008). Since lower rated bonds may experience higher 
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price volatility and it may take longer time for the dealers to find a trading 
counterparty for risky bonds, this group of models suggest larger trading costs for low 
rated  bonds. 
 Based on asymmetric information models such as Glosten and Milgrom (1985) 
and Kyle (1985), bid-ask spreads are affected by the risk of trading against informed 
traders and increases with the degree of information asymmetry in the market and 
asset value uncertainty. Given the higher level of uncertainty regarding the future cash 
flows generated by riskier assets, dealers may charge wider spreads that compensate 
them for the risk. Moreover, although a significant proportion of investors in both 
investment grade and high yield bonds consist of large and sophisticated financial 
institutions, the type of institutions and their incentive to trade may vary for 
investment grade versus high yield bonds. For example insurance companies and 
pension funds are mainly buy-and-hold investors in investment grade bonds, whereas 
hedge funds and high yield mutual funds that trade lower rated bonds may follow 
more speculative strategies.  
Recently the structural credit risk models with endogenous liquidity proposed by 
He and Milbradt (2014) and Chen, Cui, He and Milbradt (2015) also predict a positive 
relationship between corporate bonds credit risk and bid-ask spreads. 3 
                                                 
3 He and Milbradt (2014) and Chen, Cui, He and Milbradt (2015) adapt the search and bargaining 
framework of Duffy, Gârleanu, and Pedersen (2005) to model the secondary market for corporate 
bonds. Two types of investors exist in their model: High type and Low type. High type investors are the 
ones that incur no cost for holding the asset. Low type investors are the ones affected by an exogenous 
liquidity shock and incur holding cost, so they search for a dealer to get rid of the bond. Chen, Cui, He 
and Milbradt (2015) model this holding cost in light of collateralized borrowing and assume that the 
bond is part of a large portfolio including leverage and can be used as collateral for these loans. 
Borrowing against the bond involves a haircut. A decline in a bonds credit quality pushes down its 
market price and increases the haircut. This in turn drives down the low type investor valuation of the 
bond and widens the valuation wedge between high type and low type investors. Since the bid-ask 
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Empirically, the evidence is mixed. Hong and Warga (2000), Chakravarty and Sarkar 
(2003), Harris and Piwowar (2006), and Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2007) find that 
lower rated bonds have larger transaction costs. On the other hand, Schultz (2001), 
Bao, Pan and Wang (2011), and Goldstein and Hotchkiss (2017) find no significant 
relation between ratings and liquidity.  In some of the previous studies, high yield 
bonds are either eliminated from the sample or are grouped in one or two big rating 
classes. Moreover, many of these studies predate the recent financial crisis which may 
have affected the relation between credit ratings and liquidity and the possible time 
variation in this relationship is often overlooked.4 
This study contributes to the literature by examining the dynamics and 
dimensions of bond market liquidity across the entire spectrum of credit ratings using 
more than twelve years of TRACE data from 2002 to 2014 and seven different 
liquidity measures: a price impact measure, three spread measures, and three trading 
activity measures.5 As this period includes the financial crisis, this study also 
examines the effect of market distress and how liquidity varied across different rating 
categories, and whether the post-crisis regulations aiming to limit risk taking by 
                                                                                                                                            
spread in their model is a function of investors bargaining power and the valuation wedge between low 
type and high type investors, the above procedure results in a rise in the bid-ask spread. 
 
4The corporate bond market has changed dramatically since the recent financial crisis. Some new trends 
include huge amount of bond issuance, investors search for higher yield due to the nearly zero interest 
rates, great reduction in bond dealer’s net inventory positions in corporate bond, changes in their risk 
management practices and improvements in electronic trading venues. These new trends have affected 
the trading behavior of both investors and market makers and it is reasonable to assume that they may 
affect the liquidity and transactions cost across different credit ratings.   
 
5Since Hamilton and Cantor (2004) note, the frequency of default increases non-linearly across ratings, 
credit rating is not treated as a continuous variable in this study.  Hamilton and Cantor (2004) document 
three year default rates of 0.0%, 0.0%, 0.4%, 1.5%, 4.4%, 17.7% and 31% for Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B 
and Caa bonds respectively. 
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banking institutions, mainly the Volker Rule of Dodd-Frank Act, has adversely 
affected market liquidity of investment grade and high yield bonds.  
The results show that the relation between credit rating and liquidity depends in 
part on how liquidity is defined. Not only are there differences by liquidity measure, 
but there are also notable non-linearities; for example, the Amihud price impact 
measure suggests that market resilience decreases for lower rated bonds. However, in 
contrast to the common wisdom and the implications of theoretical models, we don’t 
find evidence of a monotonic increase in bid-ask spreads as we move to lower rated 
bonds. Instead, bid-ask spread measures suggest more of a step function, where 
spreads become notably higher just at the investment grade/high yield (BBB/BB) 
cutoff, and then decline. Trading activity across rating classes also show that high 
yield bonds are on average more actively traded in terms of both number of trades and 
volume after controlling for other relevant factors. There is also lower percentage of 
zero trading days for lower rated bonds. Piecewise panel regressions suggest similar 
results, implying a different relation between liquidity and credit quality within 
investment grade versus high yield bonds.  
To examine the dynamic liquidity behavior of investment grade vs. high yield 
categories, the monthly aggregate liquidity and trading activity time series is modeled 
as Markov switching AR(k) processes. Our findings suggest that during the normal 
periods, the aggregate transaction cost for riskier bonds is higher compared to low risk 
bonds, but there is an abrupt regime change during the financial crisis period: spreads 
increase dramatically for investment grade bonds, but remain relatively constant for 
high-yield bonds. While the spreads for riskier bonds are quite low in dollar terms, as 
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a percentage of price, these spreads are higher than the normal periods due to the sharp 
decline in junk bond prices during this period.  Post-crisis and during the recent period 
of regulatory changes, the results suggest an increase in the aggregate market liquidity 
as measured by price impact and bid-ask spreads and higher aggregate trading activity. 
The absolute bid-ask spreads for high yield bonds converge to a level above the 
spreads for investment grade bonds during post-crisis and regulatory periods. 
To study further the time variation in the relationship between bonds liquidity and 
credit quality, we rerun the panel regressions with rating dummies and bond and issuer 
controls separately on three sub-periods: Pre-crisis which we define as the period 
from Jul. 2002 to Nov. 2007, crisis which is the period from Dec. 2007 to June 2009 
and post-crisis which we define as the period from July 2009 to Sep. 2014. Results 
show that during the pre-crisis period, although non-monotonically, trading costs 
increase for lower rated bonds, which is consistent with the findings of some previous 
studies that used the pre-crisis bond market data such as Hong and Warga (2000), 
Chacravarty and Sarkar (2003), Harris and Piwowar (2006), and Edwards, Harris and 
Piwowar (2007). However, the panel regressions show that consistent with the results 
from Markov-switching model time series analysis, after and particularly during the 
crisis, regression coefficients become larger as we move to lower rating dummies 
within the investment grade range, while they become insignificant or negative as we 
move to lower rated bonds within the high yield category.  
A possible explanation for these findings is the heterogeneous trading behavior 
and market making activity of bond dealers for investment grade versus high yield 
bonds. We argue that dealers may be less willing to commit capital to hold riskier 
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bonds in inventory and behave more as brokers in these types of securities, 
particularly during periods of market distress when they face more capital constraints. 
As a result the observed bid-ask spreads may be more close to brokerage commission 
fees and reflect dealers search costs rather than their inventory risk.  
This view is supported by a number of previous studies. An earlier evidence of 
this kind of behavior is documented by Bessembinder and Maxwell (2008) during the 
period following the initiation of TRACE as a side effect of increased transparency. 
According to Bessembinder and Maxwell (2008), “(p)ost-TRACE, bond dealers no 
longer hold large inventories of bonds for some of the most active issues; for less-
active bonds they now serve only as brokers”. Goldstein, Hotchkiss, and Sirri (2007) 
find that dealers perform a matching brokerage function in illiquid bonds. Feldhütter 
(2012), models OTC bond markets based on Duffie, Gârleanu, and Pedersen (2005) 
framework and assumes segmented markets by trading size during liquidity shocks. 
He argues that during liquidity shocks risk limits often prohibit market makers from 
taking the bond on the book and splitting large trades. In this situation it is often the 
case that the sales person of the bank directly searches for a buyer and “typically, the 
bid-ask fee is collected by the sales person not the market maker”. More recently 
Goldstein and Hotchkiss (2017) show that dealers are most likely to quickly offset 
trades rather than holding bonds in inventory overnight or longer for the least actively 
traded or riskier bonds.  
This line of reasoning implies that the notion of bid-ask spreads as the price of 
“immediacy” services provided by dealers may not hold for riskier or less actively 
traded bonds, particularly during liquidity shocks. Therefore, caution should be taken 
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interpreting narrower bid-ask spreads on riskier bonds as an indication of better 
liquidity condition. Instead, the risk of price movement may be shifted to investors, 
particularly during liquidity shocks when they need to wait longer for the opposite side 
of the trade to arrive.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data and 
summary statistics, Section 3 describes the liquidity measures used in this study and 
their summary statistics, Section 4 analyzes the illiquidity across credit ratings, 
Section 5 analyzes the time series behavior of (il)liquidity and trading activity 
measures, Section 6 discuss the robustness tests and Section 7 concludes the paper. 
2. Data and summary statistics  
Two main sources of data for this study are Enhanced Historic TRACE corporate 
bond data, and Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD). Since July 2002, 
all corporate bond transactions in the secondary market have been disseminated 
through the TRACE system (Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine). The enhanced 
data improves the standard TRACE data in three ways: First, it contains reports of all 
transactions since July 2002 including transactions in formerly non-disseminated 
bonds (except 144A bonds). Second, it contains uncapped transaction volumes and 
historical buy-sell side information as the most significant improvements over the 
standard data. Finally, the enhanced data contains some more specialized information 
such as information on reporting date and time which allows for a better error filtering 
algorithm. The enhanced information comes at a cost of an 18 month lag in 
availability of the data (Dick-Nielsen, 2014). Although, the newest standard TRACE 
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data includes all non-144A transactions and buy/sell side indicators, it is still missing 
the uncapped volumes when compared to the enhanced data. 
This study covers the period from the initiation of TRACE in July 2002 to 
September 2014. The Enhanced TRACE data for the observation period includes 
141,997,423 transactions for 112,879 bonds. Panel A of Table 1 shows the result of 
applying Dick-Nielsen (2014) filtering procedure which includes the following steps: 
First, deleting same-day corrections and cancelations. Same-day refers to corrections 
and cancelations reported within the same reporting date (not transaction date). 
Applying this step deletes 4.4% of transactions and 0.35% of bonds from the original 
sample. Second, removing reversals and the matching original transaction report. 
Around 1.6% of transactions and 0.09% of bonds are eliminated after this step. Third, 
removing agency transactions where the principal transaction has the same price as the 
agency transaction which is a kind of double counting. This step deletes 5% of 
transactions and 4.21% of bonds. Fourth, removing one of the reports in each 
interdealer transaction pair and classify the retained report as an interdealer 
transaction. We also exclude special transactions such as trades which are not 
secondary market, trades under special circumstances, commissioned transactions, odd 
number of days to settlement, automatic give up trades, non cash sales. Applying this 
step eliminates around 28% of transactions and around 18% of bonds. In general, as a 
result of implementing the above procedure, 55,455,418 transactions and 25,658 
bonds are deleted from the original sample. 
In order to make sure that the results are not affected by possible outliers, we 
modify the Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2007) approach and apply 20% median 
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filter which eliminates a bond price if it deviates from daily median price by more than 
20%, as well as a 50% return reversal filter which eliminates a bond price if it is 
preceded and followed by a price increase or drop of more than 50%. The final 
Enhanced TRACE sample consists of 86,450,187 observations for 87,159 bonds. 
Bond characteristics such as issue date, issue size, delivery date, coupon rate, 
maturity, issuer name, industry and ratings from the main three credit rating agencies, 
i.e. Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch are obtained from Mergent FISD. 6 We 
include only the bonds that remain in the data at least for one year. Furthermore, 
following the literature on corporate bond market, we exclude issues that are 
denominated in a currency other than US dollar or have a foreign issuer, variable rate 
and zero coupon bonds, bonds that have credit enhancement, convertibles, asset-
backed, callable, putable, exchangeable, fungible, preferred, tendered, and bonds that 
are part of a unit deal. We include bonds issued by corporations in three industry 
group including Industrial, Finance and Utility. Panel B of Table 1 shows the results 
of applying these filters on FISD data. The final FISD sample includes 6,549 bonds 
issued by 1,271 companies. After merging cleaned Enhanced TRACE and FISD, we 
obtain 7,988,836 transactions on 3,118 trading days for 4,065 bonds issued by 1,187 
firms.  
The corporate bond market is characterized by illiquidity. More than 76% of the 
sample bonds are not traded on at least one month of their existence in the sample. 
However, the liquidity measures can only be calculated for bonds with sufficient 
                                                 
6 Moody’s, Standard and Poor's, and Fitch nationally recognized statistical rating organizations, or 
rating agencies that are regulated by the U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission; see Senate Bill 
3850 (109th Congress), The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/109/s3850/text. 
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number of transactions. Hence, we only keep the bonds that are traded on at least 4 
distinct days and are traded at least two times during each trading day in the sample. 
After applying these filters, the final sample includes 7,640,266 observations for 3909 
bonds issued by 1,173 firms. 
Table 2 shows the summary statistics of the final sample by year and rating 
groups. In order to compare the characteristics of the final sample with that of the 
original Enhanced TRACE-FISD merged data (before imposing FISD filters), we also 
report the summary statistics for the original data in Panel B of Table 2. As we can see 
from the second column, the number of bonds existing in the final sample gradually 
decreases throughout the sample period. This is mainly due to the notable increase in 
the number of variable rate, non US dollar denominated or foreign issuer bonds from 
2002 to 2014. The percentage of variable rate and zero coupon bonds in the Enhanced 
TRACE-FISD merged sample increased from around 9% in 2002 to around 34% in 
2014.  Also, the percentage of non US dollar denominated and foreign issuer bonds 
has increased from around 6% in 2002 to around 20% in 2014. On average about 81% 
of bonds that are alive in the sample during each year have at least one trade during 
that year. Mean and median issue size in the final sample is $351 million and $100 
million respectively. The average issue size has increased gradually by years in both 
samples particularly after the financial crisis due to the low interest rate environment 
which has made debt financing for companies substantially cheaper. However column 
3 and 4 of Table 2 show that generally the final sample consists of bonds with larger 
issue size. The representative bond in the original and final sample is investment 
grade, with a median rating in final sample close to 6 which translates to Moody’s A2 
13 
 
and Standard and Poor’s A. On average, bonds existing in the final sample throughout 
the entire sample period have higher ratings compared to the original sample.  The 
average time to maturity is 6.6 years and the average age is 8.6 years. The original 
sample on average consists of bonds with longer time to maturity and shorter age in 
most of the years. Over time, we see a gradual increase in mean and median age in our 
final sample. As we would expect the lowest average prices during the study period 
belongs to 2008 and 2009 for both samples. We can also observe that after 2012 the 
average bond price has increased substantially compared to previous periods. Bonds in 
the final sample generally have higher prices which is consistent with their higher 
quality. Finally, the average number of bonds issued by the same issuer is higher in the 
final sample compared to the original sample.  
In summary the comparison between the original and final sample shows that the 
bonds analyzed in this study on average have larger issue size, higher rating and 
higher price and are issued by issuers with larger number of bonds outstanding 
compared to the original Enhanced TRACE-FISD sample.   
Panel C of Table 2 shows the number of bonds and summary statistics of the final 
sample by rating group. On average, higher rated bonds tend to have larger issue size, 
lower coupon rate, shorter age, shorter time to maturity and higher price. Also higher 
rated bonds are generally issued by firms with larger number of issues outstanding. 
3. Liquidity measures 
In this study, we examine different aspects of liquidity by using several measures 
calculated on a monthly basis. The first measure, Amihud is as price impact measure, 
Three bid -ask spread proxies: A round-trip cost measure proposed by the authors 
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(RTC), Hong and Warga (HW)(Hong and Warga (2000) ;Chakravarty and Sarkar 
(2003)), Riskless principal trades markup (RPT) recently proposed by Harris (2015), 
and three trading activity measures including trading volume, number of trades and 
percentage of zero trading days in a month (Zero) (Lesmond, Ogden and 
Trzcinka(1999), Dick-Nielsen, Feldhütter and Lando (2012)). All these proxies, except 
volume and number of trades are in fact illiquidity measures.  
A substantial proportion of the variation in percentage bid-ask spreads across 
ratings may be due to the price differences between high rated versus low rated bonds, 
which incorporates the credit risk associated with each rating. As a result, as we move 
from high rated to low rated bonds the average of bid and ask prices declines and 
naturally pushes up the relative measures of bid-ask spreads. To eliminate this effect 
and to focus on the dollar value of transaction costs, we calculate the bid-ask spread 
measures in the absolute form. 
Having buy/sell side indicators in the Enhanced Trace sample allows us to 
compute a new roundtrip-cost measure (RTC) in the spirit of Feldhütter (2012)’s IRC, 
which was originally calculated without having buy/sell side information. As 
Feldhütter (2012) pointed out, calculating imputed roundtrip cost without having the 
order sign, results in underestimating the transactions costs. We incorporate order sign 
information in our proposed measure to remove this bias. We also include Riskless 
Principal Trade’s markup (RPT) measure recently proposed by Harris (2015) in our 
analysis. The detailed explanation of the procedure for calculating liquidity measures 
and a thorough analysis of the behavior of the latter new measures are included in the 
Appendix.  
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Panel A of Table 3 shows the summary statistics for liquidity measures. The 
mean percentage of zero-trading days is 74% and the median is 90%, which 
demonstrate a high degree of illiquidity in our sample of corporate bonds. The median 
Amihud measure is 0.32 implying that a trade of $300,000 in an average bond, for 
example, moves price by roughly 9.6%, smaller than the 10.2% found by Han and 
Zhou (2008). In contrast the Amihud measure computed in Dick-Nielsen, Feldhütter 
and Lando (2012) imply that a trade of $300,000 in an average bond moves the price 
by roughly 0.13% which is much lower compared to Han and Zhou (2008) and our 
results. This notable difference is due to the fact that Dick-Nielsen, Feldhütter and 
Lando (2012) only focus on institutional size trades in their study. The average 
roundtrip cost (RTC) for our sample is 65 cents which is relatively larger compared to 
the average IRC of 59 cents found by Feldhütter (2012). However, it’s worth 
mentioning that nearly 79% of transactions in our sample consist of retail size trades 
below $100,000 and around 40% of transactions are between $10,000 and $50,000 
(See Table 1 in the Appendix). As documented in several papers, transaction costs are 
higher for smaller trades (e.g. Schultz (2001), Chacravarty and Sarkar (2003), and 
Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2007)). Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the IRC 
measure calculated in Feldhütter (2012) tend to underestimate the transaction costs. 
The RTC is only 1 cent for the 5% most liquid bonds. Other bid-ask proxies 
demonstrate comparable mean and median values. The mean and median RPT markup 
is 67 cents and 52 cents respectively. Generally, consistent with the findings in, 
Bessembinder, Maxwell, and Venkaraman (2006), Goldstein, Hotchkiss and Sirri 
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(2007), Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2007) and Feldhütter (2012), we find modest 
average transaction costs for our sample of corporate bonds. 
Panel B of Table 3 shows the correlation among liquidity measures and their 
significance. There is 54% percent correlation between Amihud market depth measure 
and bid-ask spread as proxied by roundtrip cost (RTC). There is 32% percent 
correlation between Amihud and riskless principal trades (RTC) markup. Amihud is 
positively and significantly correlated with zero-trading days meaning that as the 
number of days in a month with at least one trade decrease, the price impact of trades 
will increase. This result is in contrast with Dick-Nielsen, Feldhutter and Lando 
(2012), as they found a negative correlation between quarterly Amihud measure and 
zero-trading days measure. There is nearly zero correlation between riskless principal 
trades’ markup (RPT) and monthly volume as well as zero-trading days. Finally, we 
can observe negative and significant correlations among trading volume and Amihud, 
RTC and HW measures.  
Panel C of Table 3 shows the mean liquidity measures by rating group. We can 
see that on average, the Amihud measure is higher for lower rated bonds. The average 
bid-ask measures increase for lower rated bonds and have the highest value for 
BB/Ba-B rating group and then decline for ratings equal or below CCC/Caa. The 
average volume is highest for AAA-AA/Aa bonds and for ratings equal or below 
CCC/Caa and the monthly number of trades has the highest value for AAA-AA/Aa 
bonds. 
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4. Regression analysis 
4.1 Panel regressions on entire sample  
The goal of this study is to investigate how various aspects of liquidity vary 
across credit ratings. Previous studies such as Hong and Warga (2000), Chacravarty 
and Sarkar (2003), Harris and Piwowar (2006) and Edwards, Harris and Piwowar 
(2007)7 find that lower credit ratings are associated with higher transaction costs. 
Other studies do not find a clear relation between credit ratings and transaction costs 
(or measures of (il)liquidity. For example, Schultz (2001), find no evidence of larger 
trading costs for lower rated bonds for a sample of daily bond transaction records of 
insurance companies. Bao, Pan and Wang (2011) find no significant relation between 
credit ratings and liquidity in their analysis of the relationship between bond 
characteristics and their proposed illiquidity measure on a sample of investment grade 
bonds. Also, holding trading or volume constant, Goldstein and Hotchkiss (2017) find 
no significant relation between ratings and liquidity.8 
The current study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, we 
investigate the non-linearities in the relationship between corporate bond credit ratings 
and liquidity which is usually overlooked in previous research. Next, unlike previous 
studies which mostly focus on the investment grade ratings, the current analysis covers 
                                                 
7For example, Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2007) estimate the effective half spread for trade size of 
20 bonds ($20,000) to be 3.4 for BBB bonds, 17.9 for B or BB bonds and 43.8 for bond with C rating 
and below. 
8Very few theoretical papers explicitly address this relationship. He and Xiong (2012), He and Milbradt 
(2014) and Chen, Cui, He and Milbradt (2015) models based on the structural credit risk models of 
Leland (1994) and Leland and Toft (1996) and search model of Duffie, Gârleanu, and Pedersen (2005) 
are consistent with the empirical findings of Bao, Pan and Wang (2011), Dick-Nielsen, Feldhütter and 
Lando (2012) and Friewald, Jankowitsch and Subrahmanyam (2012)that corporate bonds with higher 
credit ratings have lower transaction costs and that corporate bonds are less liquid during economic 
downturns, especially for riskier bonds. 
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the full spectrum of credit ratings including bonds close to default.9 Finally, we study 
different aspects of liquidity using a variety of liquidity proxies which helps us better 
understand the possible heterogeneous relation between credit ratings and various 
liquidity dimensions. 
We start by conducting a multivariate, level analysis to test whether the liquidity 
for each letter rating class is significantly different from a benchmark and how the 
mean liquidity varies across rating classes, after controlling for other relevant factors. 
We run seven panel regressions in the following form:10 
 
 
Where  , the dependent variable, is a different liquidity proxy in each 
regression.  , …, , are dummy variables taking the value of 1 if the bond’s 
rating is in Aa,…,Ca/C rating class and 0 otherwise. Aaa rating class is chosen as the 
benchmark group. The vector includes the bond level and firm level 
characteristics that are commonly used in the literature as determinants of corporate 
bond liquidity: maturity, coupon, age, issue size, coupon frequency, number of bonds 
issued by the same firm, issuer’s industry, average monthly trade size and monthly 
percentage of institutional size trades in a bond. We control for the market-wide 
variations in liquidity over time by including the year fixed effect in the model, , 
                                                 
9
Jankowitsch et al. (2014) document temporary high trading activity and price pressure on the default 
event day itself exclusively.  
 
10 . The dependent variables in these regressions have limited range, for example monthly 
volume is always a positive number and bid-ask spread measures are left censored. We have 
tested the sensitivity of our models to the limited range of variables, using Tobit regression 
method in Appendix B. Generally the results are not affected after controlling for left-
censored dependent variables in our regressions. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
(1)/8
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   Controls
19 
 
where k is the year indicator (k=1 for 2002,…,k=13 for 2014). By estimating the 
above model, we assume that each rating class has a different liquidity level 
(intercept), controlling for other factors and test how these levels vary across rating 
classes and whether they are significantly different from the liquidity level of the 
benchmark group (Aaa/AAA). We also assume that the effect of control variables on 
liquidity is not significantly different across rating classes.  represent the 
difference between the expected iliquidity, of each letter 
rating class with the expected iliquidity of the benchmark group. Each issuer in our 
sample may have multiple bonds outstanding with highly correlated characteristics. 
Hence, we correct the standard errors by clustering observations at the issuer level and 
also control for heteroscedasticity using White-Huber robust standard errors.11 
Table 4 shows the results for the above regression analysis. Columns 2 to 8 of 
Table 4 show the regression coefficients and their significance levels for each liquidity 
and trading activity measure. To better see how the intercepts ( ) vary by 
credit ratings, Figure 1 shows the (il)liquidity intercept of each rating class for 
different (il)liquidity proxies and their 95% confidence intervals. Using monthly 
Amihud measure as dependent variable, we observe that the illiquidity levels for 
investment grade rating classes are not statistically different from that of Aaa rating. 
However, the coefficient for Aa is negative and significant at 0.1 level implying that 
controlling for other relevant factors, Aa rated bonds have slightly lower Amihud 
measure. The coefficients for rating classes within the speculative grade range are 
positive and highly significant indicating that trading speculative grade bonds is 
                                                 
11To save space the t-statistics are not reported and are available upon request. 
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associated with significantly higher price impact. As Figure 1 shows, the mean 
Amihud is particularly high for bonds close to default (Ca/CC/C rated bonds). For 
example the 0.51 value for the coefficient of Ca/CC rated bonds tells us that holding 
other factors constant, a trade of $300,000 in a Ca/CC rated bond moves the price by 
15.3% more than a trade of the same size in Aaa/AAA bonds.  
The results for the bid-ask spreads as measured by three proxies: RTC, HW and 
RPT are quite different from what observed for the Amihud measure. The graph of  
coefficients in Figure 1 show a nearly inverted U-shaped relationship between the 
absolute bid-ask spreads and credit ratings using all three proxies. As we can see in 
Panel B of Figure 1, the maximum value for expected bid-ask spread belongs to 
Ba/BB rated bonds which is the rating class right below the investment grade 
boundary. The Expected spread for Aa/AA rated bonds (as proxied by RTC and HW) 
is significantly lower than that of Aaa/AAA bonds. The expected bid-ask spread 
increases as we move from Aa/AA rating to Investment grade boundary and then starts 
to decline for speculative grade bonds.  
Analyzing the relationship between credit ratings and monthly trading activity 
variables also reveals interesting results. As we can see from both columns 6 to 8 of 
Table 4 and Figure 1, after controlling for bond and issuer level characteristics that 
affect trading activity, both monthly number of trades and monthly volume increase 
when we move from investment grade to speculative grade ratings. These results are 
consistent with the notion that the majority of the investors in investment grade bonds 
are large institutions with buy-and-hold strategy and after the investment grade bonds 
are placed in the portfolios of these institutional investors they are rarely traded. The 
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average percentage of monthly zero trading days also declines significantly as we 
move from investment grade to non-investment grade category. These results are 
consistent with a recent evidence provided by Mizrach (2015). Dividing the corporate 
bond market to two segments based on trading activity (1000 most active issues and 
the rest), he finds that the percentage of investment grade bonds in the active trading 
group is less than their percentage in the less active trading group for their entire 
sample period from 2003 to 2015. In particular, he finds that on average 35% of the 
bonds in the less active category have A ratings. 
Overall, the results from Table 4 and Figure 1 show that various dimensions of 
liquidity vary differently and non-linearly across ratings. The Amihud price impact 
measure increases as we move towards the lower rated bonds, whereas the transaction 
costs in the form of bid-ask spread seem to be highest for bonds with ratings close to 
investment grade boundary and declines for lower rated high yield bonds. Specifically, 
the results from Table 4 and Figure 1 appear to suggest two distinct liquidity regimes 
among Investment grade and high yield bonds. To further explore the non-linear 
nature of the relationship between ratings and liquidity and to quantify the liquidity 
differences among the three regimes, we examine a piecewise regression model in the 
following from: 
 
Where  is one of the seven liquidity measures in each regression,  is 
a dummy variable equal to 1 if the bond has rating below Baa3 and 0 otherwise, and 
( 11)1 2 1 2
(2)
ILLIQ Rating RatingJunk Junkit itit it it
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 is a discrete variable taking values 1 to 21 for bonds with Aaa/AAA,…,C 
ratings respectively.  vector includes the control variables used in the 
previous regression. We also control for time variation in liquidity using years fixed 
effect ( .  
Estimating the piecewise model as described above results in two distinct 
regression lines for Investment grade and high yield bonds. We test whether these 
regressions lines are statistically different: 
1 1
1 2 2 1 2
11
(3)
( 11 ) ( ) 11
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Table 5 reports the results of piecewise regressions for each liquidity measure. To 
save space we don’t report the coefficients and t-statistics of control variables, as they 
are roughly similar to the values observed in Table 4. Column 2 shows the results for 
Amihud measure. The significant and positive coefficient for shows that the 
price impact is larger for lower rated bonds within the investment grade category. The 
positive and highly significant  shows that within the high yield range, Amihud 
increases more as we move to lower rated bonds. 
Figure 2 helps us better understand the results from Table 5. Panel A of Figure 2 
illustrates the results for Amihud measure. The piecewise model allows us to quantify 
the magnitude of breaks among three regression lines for each measure. Columns 3 to 
8 of Table 5 and Panel 2 of Figure 2 show the results for bid- ask spread and trading 
activity measures. We can see that the bid-ask spreads increase significantly as we 
move to lower rated bonds within the investment grade range. The regression slopes 
for high yield bonds is negative and significantly different from that of investment 
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grade bonds. For trading activity measures, the results show that the monthly number 
of trades and volume significantly increase as we move to lower rated bonds within 
investment grade category, whereas the percentage of zero trading days remains quite 
constant across the investment grade bonds. Generally the number of trades and 
volume is significantly higher and the percentage zero trading days is significantly 
lower for high yield bonds.  Generally the results of piecewise regressions are 
consistent with the findings from Table 4 and shed more light on the non-linear 
relationship between credit ratings and liquidity of corporate bonds. 
4.2 Panel regression on sample sub-periods 
In the previous section, we explored the relationship between various measures of 
liquidity and credit ratings over the entire sample period. However, our sample 
includes the period of recent financial crisis which is characterized by several bank 
failures, downgrades, severe liquidity shocks and funding constraints faced by bond 
traders. These events may have a significant impact on the relative liquidity and 
trading costs across rating classes.  
To study the possible time variation in the relationship between bonds liquidity 
and their credit quality, in this section we rerun the panel regression analyses of 
equation 1 for various liquidity measures on  three separate sub samples: Pre-crisis 
which we define as the period from  Jul. 2002 to Nov. 2007, crisis which is the period 
from Dec. 2007 to June 2009 and post-crisis  which we define as  the period from July 
2009 to Sep.2014.  
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The results of these regressions are reported in Table 6 and Figure 3. Since our 
focus is the coefficients of the rating dummies, to save space the coefficients of the 
control variables are not reported in Table 6.  Panel A shows the results for pre-crisis 
period.  We can observe that during the pre-crisis period, although non-monotonically, 
the rating dummies’ coefficients are positive and significant for ratings equal and 
below BBB/Baa and increase as we move to lower rated bonds.  These results are in 
line with the findings of some previous studies that used the pre-crisis bond market 
data such as Hong and Warga (2000), Chacravarty and Sarkar (2003), Harris and 
Piwowar (2006), and Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2007) and find larger trading 
costs for lower rated bonds.  
Panel B and C of Table 6 show the results for crisis and post-crisis periods. For 
regressions with Amihud measure as the dependent variable, we can see that the 
coefficients for ratings equal or below BBB/Baa are positive, significant, and larger 
compared to the pre-crisis period  but are mostly negative and insignificant during the 
post-crisis period. For bid-ask spread measures the coefficients are negative and 
significant for high yield bonds particularly for ratings equal or below Caa/CCC 
category during the crisis and mostly negative but insignificant for post-crisis period.  
These results show an interesting phenomenon that during the financial crisis high 
yield bonds trade at lower bid-ask spread levels. To further examine the liquidity 
dynamics of investment grade versus high yield bonds, in the next section we conduct 
a time series regime switching analyses that enables us to identify the possible regime 
shifts in aggregate market liquidity as well as investment grade versus high yield 
categories. 
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5. Time series analysis  
 In this section, we explore the dynamic behavior of the liquidity and trading 
activity measures both at the aggregate market level and across rating categories using 
a simple Markov switching model. Given different economic and regulatory 
conditions throughout the sample period and their possible impact on the investors’ 
risk tolerance and the dealers’ risk taking capacity , it is reasonable to hypothesize that 
bonds of different credit risk  may show different liquidity patterns  in normal vs. 
distressed market conditions.  This issue becomes particularly critical when we note 
that the vulnerable segments of the market may be the most affected during economic 
downturns or regulatory changes and can possibly act as a source of contagion for 
triggering systemic risk during severe liquidity shocks. 
The current analysis also contributes to the recent growing literature on the 
impact of post-crisis regulations on the bond market liquidity. Particularly the “Volker 
Rule” of Dodd-Frank Act prohibits bank holding companies and their affiliates from 
engaging in risky proprietary trading and restricts bank ownership of hedge funds and 
private equity funds. Several market participant argue that the Volker Rule may have 
unintended consequences on dealers’ liquidity provision, as it is very difficult to 
distinguish risky proprietary trading from normal market making activity (Duffie 
(2012)).  
Few recent papers address these concerns: For example Bessembinder et al. 
(2016) Study dealer liquidity provision in the corporate bond market during the post-
crisis period and find evidence that the Volker Rule has unintended adverse impact on 
market liquidity, as non-bank dealers are more willing to commit capital, complete 
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block trades, hold inventory and trade on the principal basis on stressful days during 
the most recent years as compared to the pre-crisis period. Bao, O’Hara and Zhou 
(2016) Study the impact of Volker rule on corporate bond liquidity in periods of 
stressed market condition and find that bond liquidity deterioration around fallen angel 
downgrades has worsened following the implementation of the Volcker Rule.  
The current analysis is distinguished from the previous studies in two ways. First, 
we examine the change in the market liquidity of Investment grade vs. high yield 
categories to capture the possibly different dynamic liquidity pattern for low risk 
versus riskier bonds.  Second, the Markov switching model used for this analysis 
doesn’t require making prior assumptions regarding the timing of regime changes, as 
opposed to diff-in-diff methods used in the previous studies. Given that it usually 
takes a long time for major regulations to become formally effective and their actual 
impacts on the financial markets may appear in advance of the formal compliance 
dates, it is very difficult to identify an exact date as the effective date of a regulation. 
For example the original effective date of the Volker rule was scheduled on July 21, 
2012. However, implementation was delayed until an effective date of April 1, 2014, 
with the conformance period extended to July 21, 2015.  
 To obtain the monthly (il)liquidity time series, we calculate the bond level 
(il)liquidity measures in each month and calculate the monthly average across all 
bonds in our sample. Besides the liquidity and trading activity measures examined in 
the previous section, we analyze three more measures of dealers’ capital commitment 
suggested by Bessembinder et al. (2016) to capture “the implicit costs associated with 
trades that were desired but not completed”. In particular, the riskless principal trades 
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(RPTs) are considered as “effectively agency” trades that don’t effectively influence 
the dealers’ inventory. Hence a higher proportion of riskless principal trades (RPTs) in 
a month may imply dealers’ reluctance to commit capital.  Next, we consider the 
monthly percentage of block volume, to capture the difficulty of placing large orders. 
Finally, we examine the monthly percentage of dealer-to-dealer trades as opposed to 
the customer trades to captures interdealer market activity. Higher block volume and 
interdealer percentage may imply better liquidity conditions.  
5.1 Markov-switching model estimation and results 
The aggregate monthly liquidity and trading activity measures,  are 
modeled as non-linear  processes that depend on their own past history, 
 random shocks,  and a discrete regime process, , 
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The switching regimes affect the intercept,  autocorrelation 
coefficients,  and volatility,  of the above process. The process 
governing the dynamics of the underlying regime  follows a first-order Markov 
chain, where the transition matrix is: 
[ , ] 1Pr ( | ) (5)i j t t ijS j S i p      
The Maximum Likelihood and EM algorithm of Gray (1996) are used to estimate 
the models’ parameters and the regime probabilities. For model selection, AR(1) and 
AR(2) as well as simple Markov switching intercept models are considered as 
benchmarks and Markov switching AR(1) and AR (2) processes are examined based 
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on their AIC and BIC criteria as well as their interpretability. Table 21 in Appendix B 
shows AIC and BIC for the various models examined for each liquidity tie series. The 
results show that all liquidity and trading activity time series can be sufficiently 
explained by Markov Switching  processes with maximum order of 2 and 
maximum of 4 different regimes. The mean and variance for each regime can be 
obtained as follows. For the case of an AR (1) model, we have: 
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For regime switching   processes, the mean and variance for each regime 
are calculated as: 
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The results of estimating the above model on liquidity and trading activity time 
series are reported in Table 7. For the purpose of this study, the mean and volatility of 
each regime have the most intuitive interpretation. To better interpret the results and 
understand the relation between the regimes governed by the unobserved Markov 
process and actual market events during the study period, we divide the sample into 
four periods and then calculate the proportion of each period that can be explained by 
each regime using the filtered probabilities. In particular, the period from July 2002 to 
November 2007 is considered as the pre-crisis period, December 2007 to June 2009 as 
the crisis period, July 2009 to June 2012 as the post-crisis period and July 2012 to 
September 2014 as the regulatory period. July 2012 is the original effective date of the 
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Volker rule and is similarly considered by Bessembinder et al. (2016) as the beginning 
of the regulatory period.  
 Panel A of Table 7 shows the results for the aggregate market liquidity and Panel 
B shows the results for the time series obtained by calculating the difference between 
the aggregate (il) liquidity of high yield and investment grade bonds. If the hypothesis 
regarding the different dynamic behavior of liquidity dimensions among risky and low 
risk bonds holds, we should observe changing regimes in these series.  
For Amihud measure, the regime with highest mean and volatility forms 58% of 
the crisis period. The pre and post crisis periods are governed by the same regime of 
relatively low mean and standard deviation. Interestingly, we can see that the regime 
with the lowest mean and standard deviation almost completely overlaps with the 
regulatory period. The mean Amihud during the regulatory period is 0.30 which is 
lower than pre-crisis and post-crisis periods by 16 basis points. Figure 4 also 
demonstrates various regimes and their filtered probabilities for the Amihud measure. 
RTC, HW and RPT measures of bid-ask spread, show similar patterns. In particular 
for RTC, the regime with the highest mean (1.67) almost entirely happens during the 
crisis period and its intersection with other periods is negligible whereas the regime 
with the lowest mean (0.00) has its largest overlap with the regulatory period. 
HW and RPT are best described by a two regime model where the regime with 
highest illiquidity clearly overlaps with the crisis period.  Generally, the results for 
trading costs measures, indicate  highly illiquid regime during the crisis period and do 
not provide any evidence of an increase in transaction costs following the crisis and 
particularly the most recent regulatory period. 
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Analyzing the trading activity time series, we observe two distinct regimes for the 
aggregate monthly number of trades. These regimes partially overlap with pre-
crisis/crisis vs. post-crisis/regulatory periods with the higher mean and volatility 
regime covering almost the entire post-crisis and regulatory periods. The two regimes 
have mean difference of around 35. The standard deviation of the regime dominating 
pre-crisis/crisis periods is 3.37 compared to 9.76 for the other regime. The results for 
the Zero measure also shows an increase in trading activity and reduction in monthly 
zero trading days following the crisis. Generally, these results are indicative of an 
increase in trading activity during the recent periods. The results for the dealer’s 
capital commitment measures show that for the percentage interdealer trades, the 
regime with the mean of 46.6% and standard deviation of 1.9% almost completely 
overlaps with the post-crisis and regulatory period and the regime with lower mean of 
30.56% and higher standard deviation of 6.84% completely overlaps with the pre-
crisis and crisis period. Results for the percentage block volume demonstrate a similar 
pattern. The percentage RPT trades show an increase during the recent regulatory 
period. Higher percentage of RPT trades may imply less dealers’ willingness to 
provide liquidity by trading from their inventory and hence indicate deteriorating 
liquidity conditions. However the regime with the higher mean (8.05) only describes 
20% of the regulatory period. 
 Panel B of Table 7 shows the results for the spread between the price impact and 
trading cost of high yield vs. investment grade bonds. While the Amihud measure is 
higher for the high yield bonds over the entire sample period, still a regime switching 
is observed with the wider spread regime dominating the crisis period and the 
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narrower spread regime forming the major proportion of pre and post crisis periods 
and the entire regulatory period. These results imply that the price impact of 
investment grade and high yield bonds are converging more after the crisis and 
particularly during the regulatory period. Analyzing the bid-ask spread measures 
shows an interesting pattern. While the execution costs for investment grade bonds 
increases during the financial crisis, they actually decrease for the high yield bonds 
during the same period.  For example, Figure 5 shows the regime changes for HW 
measure. As we can observe from Table7 and Figure 5, the regime with lower 
transaction costs for high yield bonds, forms 63% of the crisis period and the regime 
with higher positive mean mostly overlap with the pre-crisis and regulatory periods. 
Similar results are observed for RTC and RPT measures. This finding is consistent 
with the search and bargaining model of bid-ask spreads. Higher selling pressure of 
riskier bonds during the crisis period and lack of enough buyers relative to sellers 
adversely affects the bargaining power of bond dealers and reduces the bid-ask 
spreads charged for these bonds.  
The trading activity spreads show two distinct regimes for the number of trades, 
both with negative means, which indicates lower mean number of trades for HY bonds 
for both regimes. However the regime with wider spread (mean of -5.58) covers 86% 
of the pre-crisis period and the regime with narrower spread covers 97% of the post-
crisis and 88%of the regulatory period which shows that the aggregate monthly 
number of HY bond trades is increasing with respect to the IG trades in recent periods. 
The measures of dealers’ capital commitment show the following patterns: The mean 
percentage of RPT trades is becoming larger for HY bonds compared to IG bonds 
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during the regulatory period by around 5.2%. This result provides evidence of dealers 
becoming more reluctant to conduct principal transactions for riskier bonds during the 
regulatory period. However the findings from the other two measures do not show 
evidence of less liquidity provision for riskier bonds following the crisis, as the 
percentage of interdealer trades in HY bonds have become higher after the crisis and 
particularly during the regulatory period. %block volume for HY bonds for this period 
is comparable to pre-crisis and is smaller than the %block volume for the IG category.  
6. Robustness tests 
We test the robustness of the results on a subsample of top bonds for each issuer 
as they attract most of the trading activity.  Ronen and Zhou (2013) define the bond 
with the highest institutional trade volume immediately following an earnings 
announcement (and before NYSE market open) as the top bond for the firm. Based on 
their findings some bonds attract more order flow than others after earnings 
announcement, with distinct patterns of large institutional trades clustering in one or 
few bonds issued by the same firm. They suggest that top bonds have the following 
characteristics most of the time and can be predicted ex ante based on these 
characteristics: Have the longest original maturity among the bonds issued by the 
same firm, are the most recently issued, have at least one attached embedded option, 
have relatively high offering amount, are one of the issuer’s three most liquid bonds, 
are the issuer’s highest rated bonds. We use the above characteristics (except having 
embedded options12) to identify the top bonds of each issuer on a monthly basis that 
                                                 
12 In the data filtering stage the bonds with embedded options like call and put options are removed 
from the sample so we didn’t consider this characteristic in my procedure of estimating top bonds. 
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form around 73% of our sample of bonds.13 We also construct a sample consisting of a 
single top bond for each issuer in the following way: for each issuer, we identify the 
bond that has been in the “top” role during a longer period (the bond that has the 
maximum number of months as a top bond). The unique top bonds estimated this way 
form around 32% of our sample. We repeated the regressions on these subsamples and 
the results are generally robust.  
We also repeated the regressions on two subsample of retail size and institutional 
size trades and found qualitatively similar results. 14 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we use more than twelve years of bond transaction data from 
TRACE to conduct a comprehensive investigation of how liquidity and trading 
activity of corporate bonds vary with their credit ratings and how the dynamic 
behavior of this relationship changes over time. 
Our main finding is that unlike the implications of traditional microstructure 
model, the trading costs as measured by bid-ask spreads do not increase monotonically 
with credit risk.   Instead, we find and inverted U-shaped relationship over the entire 
sample where the bid-ask spreads increase with credit risk for investment grade bonds 
but decline gradually after we cross the investment grade / high yield boundary. 
Moreover studying the dynamics of this relationship using panel regressions over three 
subsamples shows that trading costs become more negatively related to ratings as we 
move to riskier bonds following and particularly during the financial crisis.  
                                                 
13 The “top” role for an issuer’s bond shifts across issues over time with around 60% shift their role 
after one announcement and around 90% maintain their position for at most three quarters. 
14 . Results from the robustness tests are non reported but are available from the authors upon request.  
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Further, we examine the liquidity of investment grade vs. high yield categories by 
modeling the monthly aggregate liquidity and trading activity time series as Markov 
switching AR(k) processes. The results show that during the normal periods, the 
aggregate transaction costs for riskier bonds is higher compared to low risk bonds, 
however this relationship demonstrate an abrupt regime change during the crisis 
period: while the spreads increase dramatically for investment grade bonds, they stay 
relatively invariant for HY bonds.  
These results can possibly be explained in light of a search based framework in 
which bond dealers actively search for trading counterparty to mitigate their holding 
period risk or even don’t take inventory risk until they find the opposite side of the 
trade, particularly during liquidity shocks. Recent empirical evidence supports this 
explanation. This may undermine the informativeness of bid-ask spreads as an 
appropriate measure of liquidity for the most risky segments of the markets or during 
periods of market distress and highlight the importance of other measures that better 
reflect the cost of liquidity and dealers capital commitment.  Narrowing our focus to 
bid-ask spreads to gauge market liquidity for some type of securities may be a case of 
being “penny wise and pound foolish”.  
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     Figure1:  Expected liquidity across credit ratings after controlling for other relevant     
variables (All proxies except #Trades and Volume measure illiquidity; Dashed lines 
show 95% confidence intervals) 
Panel A: Amihud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Bid-ask spread and trading activity measures 
 
 
 
Panel B: Bid-ask spread and trading activity measures 
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Figure2: Visualizing piecewise regression results 
(The numbers on each line show the intercept and the slope) 
Panel A: Amihud  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Bid-ask spread and trading activity 
 
 
Panel B: Bid-ask spread and trading activity measure 
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Figure3: 
  Expected liquidity across credit ratings before, during and after the financial crisis 
Panel A: Amihud 
 
 
Panel B: RTC 
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Figure 4: 
 Regime changes for the aggregate market Amihud measure and the filtered probabilities for 
each regime 
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Figure5: 
Regime changes for HY vs. IG aggregate bid-ask spread (as proxied by HW) measure and the 
filtered probabilities for each regime 
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Table 1: Data filtering steps 
This table shows the number of observations in original Enhanced TRACE and Mergent FISD datasets as 
well as the number of observations left and percentage of omitted observations after each step of the 
filtering process. #bonds is the number of bond issues, # trades Is the number of transactions. %Omitted, 
is the omitted bonds in each step as a percentage of the original sample. For FISD data, % Omitted is 
bonds omitted in each step as a percentage of all corporate bonds that exist in the original sample period 
for at least one year with non-missing offering date and price. 
Panel A: Enhanced TRACE filtering process 
Original Enhanced TRACE sample 
# bonds # trades % Omitted 
112,879 141,997,423 - 
Dick-Nielsen filter:    
 Same-day corrections and cancelations 112,482 135,798,340 0.35 
 Reversals and the matching original transaction report 112,378 133,557,702 0.09 
 Agency transactions where the principal transaction has 
the same price as the agency transaction 
107,629 126,469,001 4.21 
 One of the reports in each interdealer transaction pair and 
trades that are not secondary market, special 
circumstances, commissioned , odd number of days to 
settlement, automatic give up and noncash trades 
87,221 86,542,005 18.08 
Median and reversal filter:    
 20% daily median and 50% reversal  87,159 86,450,187 0.05 
Panel B: FISD filtering process 
Original FISD sample* 
#bonds #firms 
% 
Omitted 
325,810 13,381 - 
Bonds that exist in the sample for at least one year with non-
missing offering date and price 
87,032 8,653 - 
Exclude:    
 Secured 87,001 8,646 0.04 
 Variable rate and zero coupon 47,142 8,070 45.80 
 Non US dollar denominated and/or foreign issuer 33,188 6,072 16.03 
 Credit enhancement 29,687 5,717 4.02 
 Convertible 27,975 4,960 1.97 
 Asset backed 27,446 4,914 0.61 
 Preferred 26,947 4,913 0.57 
 Fungible 22,023 4,676 5.66 
 Exchangeable 17,160 3,911 5.59 
 Callable 7,018 1,346 11.65 
 Putable 6,786 1,326 0.27 
 Unit-deal 6,783 1,323 0.00 
 Industry group: not industry, finance or utility 6,766 1,313 0.02 
 Non-rated or rating type not FR,MR SPR 6,549 1,271 0.25 
Panel C: Additional filtering and observations by liquidity proxy 
Merged TRACE-FISD* 7,988,836 4,065 1,187 
 Exclude bonds that are traded less than 4 days and less 
than two times during each trading day 
7,640,266 3,909 1,173 
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
This table reports summary statistics for our sample of bonds by year. # Bonds is the number of bonds that exist in the sample during each period. Issue 
size is the bond’s face value issued in millions of dollars. Coupon is the bond coupon payment in percent. Maturity is the bond’s time to maturity in 
years. Age is the time since issuance in years. Rating is the average of numerical translation of Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s and Fitch rating: 
1=Aaa/AAA, 21=C. Price is the average market value of the bond in dollars. # Issuer bonds, is the number of bonds issued by each firm. 
 
 #Bonds  
Issue size (M) Coupon Maturity Age Ratings Price # Issuer bonds 
Mean Med Mean Med Mean Med Mean Med Mean Med Mean Med Mean Med 
Panel A: Summary statistics by year after imposing all filtering steps 
2002 3152 141 100 7.1 7.0 6.5 3.6 6.5 6.7 7.0 6.3 102 105 7.8 4 
2003 3293 147 100 7.0 7.0 5.8 3.0 6.9 7.1 7.2 6.3 105 106 8.0 4 
2004 3039 242 100 6.9 7.0 5.5 2.7 7.5 7.9 7.0 6.0 106 105 8.5 4 
2005 2604 269 100 6.8 6.9 5.8 2.8 8.0 8.7 6.9 6.0 104 103 9.3 5 
2006 2135 302 100 6.7 6.9 6.3 2.8 8.5 8.9 6.8 6.0 102 101 10.0 5 
2007 1826 359 125 6.6 6.8 6.7 3.1 9.0 9.4 6.6 6.0 103 101 10.6 5 
2008 1574 416 150 6.6 6.8 7.0 3.7 9.7 9.9 6.6 6.0 98 100 11.6 6 
2009 1290 487 150 6.7 7.0 7.7 4.3 10.3 11.1 7.3 6.1 97 101 11.9 5 
2010 1159 573 150 6.6 7.0 8.0 4.9 10.8 12.1 7.6 6.3 104 105 11.9 5 
2011 1071 661 200 6.5 6.9 8.0 5.2 11.3 13.1 7.5 6.3 105 106 12.7 6 
2012 1104 672 200 6.0 6.6 7.7 5.2 10.7 11.8 7.4 6.6 109 106 14.5 6 
2013 1054 702 178 5.7 6.3 7.8 5.3 10.6 9.9 7.2 7.0 110 107 18.2 6 
2014 935 741 175 5.7 6.5 7.9 6.1 11.4 11.1 7.2 7.0 111 108 19.2 6 
Panel B: Summary statistics by year before imposing FISD filtering steps 
2002 14831 209 105 6.8 6.9 8.0 5.1 4.2 3.6 8.6 8 95 100 4.0 1 
2003 19054 191 100 6.3 6.5 8.0 5.0 3.7 2.4 8.1 7 99 101 4.7 1 
2004 20804 184 50 5.8 5.9 8.2 5.3 3.3 1.8 7.7 7 101 100 5.2 1 
2005 21698 182 35 5.6 5.5 8.1 5.3 3.4 2.0 8.2 8 99 100 5.5 1 
2006 22016 193 30 5.5 5.5 8.1 5.2 3.6 2.4 7.7 6 98 98 5.7 1 
2007 22750 201 24 5.4 5.5 8.2 5.2 3.7 2.8 6.9 5 98 99 6.1 1 
2008 22444 206 17 5.1 5.4 8.0 5.0 3.9 3.2 9.1 7 91 95 6.7 2 
2009 21384 239 24 5.1 5.5 7.9 4.8 4.3 3.6 8.4 7 89 96 6.5 2 
2010 21802 254 29 5.0 5.4 7.9 5.0 4.2 3.4 8.6 8 99 100 6.2 2 
2011 21829 266 32 4.8 5.3 7.9 5.0 4.2 3.2 8.0 7 100 100 6.2 2 
2012 24448 254 22 4.3 4.8 7.2 4.4 3.9 2.1 8.1 7 103 101 7.0 2 
2013 21888 259 23 4.0 4.3 6.9 4.1 4.1 2.3 8.6 8 109 102 6.8 2 
2014 16355 302 70 4.1 4.4 7.2 4.2 4.9 3.1 8.6 8 112 104 5.8 2 
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Table 2 (continued): Summary statistics 
This table reports summary statistics for our sample of bonds by year. # Bonds is the number of bonds that exist in the sample during each period. 
Issue size is the bond’s face value issued in millions of dollars. Coupon is the bond coupon payment in percent. Maturity is the bond’s time to 
maturity in years. Age is the time since issuance in years. Rating is the average of numerical translation of Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s and Fitch 
rating: 1=Aaa/AAA, 21=C. Price is the average market value of the bond in dollars. # Issuer bonds, is the number of bonds issued by each firm. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 #Bonds  
Issue size (M) Coupon Maturity Age Ratings Price # issuer bonds 
Mean Med Mean Med Mean Med Mean Med Mean Med Mean Med Mean Med 
Panel C: Summary statistics by rating group for the cleaned sample 
AA/Aa 1154 555 175 6.1 6.5 5.6 3.6 5.2 5.1 3.7 4.0 103 102 14.5 8 
A;BBB/Baa 2924 347 100 6.4 6.7 6.3 3.9 5.6 5.6 6.8 6.0 103 102 13.5 5 
BB/Ba; B 495 195 125 7.1 7.1 7.1 3.0 7.0 6.8 12.0 12.0 96 99 7.7 3 
CCC/Caa 190 227 150 7.7 7.7 8.0 4.3 9.1 9.4 17.7 17.0 72 82 5.6 4 
Total 3909 351 100 6.7 6.9 6.6 3.5 8.6 8.3 7.1 6.3 104 104 32 4 
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Table 3: Statistics for liquidity measures 
This table shows statistics for corporate bond liquidity measures. The measures are 
calculated monthly for each bond using corporate bond transactions data from TRACE 
during the period from July 2002 to September 2014. There are a total of 3909 bond issues 
and 1173 bonds issuers in our sample during this period. Panel A shows quintiles for the 
liquidity measures. Panel B shows the correlation among the measures.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics for liquidity measures 
 
  
Amihud RTC HW RPT Volume # trades 
Zero 
(%) 
Mean 0.57 0.65 1.34 0.67 14.18 32 74 
95th  1.99 1.90 4.01 1.74 64.40 145 100 
75th 0.75 0.88 1.91 0.92 5.5 23 100 
50th 0.32 0.47 0.88 0.52 0.10 3 90 
25th 0.09 0.21 0.35 0.28 0.00 0 53 
5th 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.12 0.00 0 0 
Panel B: Correlation matrix for liquidity measures 
 
Amihud RTC HW RPT Volume #trades 
Zero 
(%) 
Amihud 1.00       
RTC 0.54*** 1.00      
HW 0.58*** 0.65*** 1.00     
RPT 0.32*** 0.50*** 0.37*** 1.00    
Volume -0.11*** -0.07*** -0.13*** 0.00 1.00   
#trades -0.01 0.05*** -0.01 0.06*** 0.50*** 1.00  
Zero 0.06*** 0.14*** 0.12*** -0.00 -0.25*** -0.41*** 1.00 
Panel C: Mean liquidity measures by rating groups 
 
Amihud      RTC      HW     RPT 
  
Volume 
  #trades 
 Zero 
(%) 
AA/Aa 0.49 0.54 1.08 0.61 19.06 39 68.37 
A;BBB/Baa 0.56 0.66 1.36 0.67 12.94 31 74.48 
BB/Ba; B 0.74 0.87 1.82 0.81 12.81 35 69.38 
CCC/Caa 0.85 0.64 1.45 0.67 17.51 28 79.07 
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   Table 4: Panel regressions for liquidity proxies. 
     This table reports coefficient estimates for monthly panel regressions of various liquidity proxies on 
credit rating dummies controlling for issue level and issuer level characteristics. The dependent 
variables are Amihud, RTC, HW, RPT, #Trades, Volume, Zero for column 2 to 7 respectively, as 
defined in the text. Aa/AA,…,C are dummy variables equal to one if  Moody’s rating class for the 
bond is Aa (Aa or Aa2 or Aa3),…C, and zero otherwise. If the bond is not rated by Moody’s, S&P 
rating is used. Control variables are defined both in Table 2 and the text. Utility is a dummy variable 
equal to one, if the issuer belongs to utility industry group and zero otherwise. Finance is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the issuer is a financial firm and zero otherwise. 
 Price impact  Bid-ask spread   Trading activity 
Amihud RTC HW RPT #Trades Volume Zero 
Rating dummies: 
Aa/AA -0.06*  -0.06** -0.17*** 0.00  -15.78*** -7.28** -1.88 
A -0.03  -0.01 -0.09** 0.05***  -6.78 -6.06** -1.38 
Baa/BBB 0.03  0.08*** 0.08 0.12***  4.60 -1.65 -0.26 
Ba/BB 0.10***  0.15*** 0.23*** 0.18***  23.59*** 2.81 
-
10.98*** 
B 0.12***  0.12*** 0.16* 0.10***  19.73*** 8.30** -9.00*** 
Caa/CCC 0.19***  0.07 0.21* 0.13***  49.97*** 28.33*** 
-
17.82*** 
Ca/CC/C 0.51***  -0.09* -0.05 -0.05  11.98 8.74** -5.49 
Bond/firm controls: 
Trade size -0.00***  -0.00 -0.00 0.00  -0.10** 5.80*** 0.05*** 
% Inst. trades -0.97***  -0.62*** -1.91*** -0.34***  -72.94*** 8.39** 18.32*** 
Maturity 0.02***  0.02*** 0.06*** 0.02***  -0.40*** 0.01 0.23*** 
Coupon 0.03***  0.04*** 0.06*** 0.02***  -2.79*** -2.15*** 2.60*** 
Age 0.00  -0.00** 0.01** -0.01***  0.05 -0.20 0.20 
Issue size 0.06***  0.03*** -0.10*** 0.07***  180.50*** 94.42*** 
-
36.19*** 
Coupon freq. 0.01**  0.01*** 0.00 0.01  -2.30*** 0.59*** 3.14*** 
# Issuer bonds -0.00***  0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*  0.75*** 0.16*** -0.02 
Utility 0.09***  0.10 0.04 -0.04  -3.20 2.48** 10.98*** 
Finance 0.05***  0.00 0.04 -0.01  3.00 -0.85 -3.54*** 
Intercept 0.63***  0.55*** 1.51*** 0.48***  52.25*** 10.44** 33.71*** 
Year fixed 
effect 
Y  Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
# Bonds 3,478  3,379 3,082 2,450  3,478 3,478 3,478 
Obs 129,573  120,660 93,977 61,567  129,573 129,573 129,573 
Adjusted R2 0.22  0.20 0.36 0.16  0.32 0.37 0.38 
*indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates 
significance at the1% level. 
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            Table 5: Piecewise panel regressions. 
This table reports the coefficient estimates for piecewise monthly panel regressions for various liquidity proxies. The regression model is in the 
following form:   
                             
Rating is the numerical translation of Moody’s rating: 1=Aaa, 21=C. Junk is a dummy variable equal to one if the Moody’s rating for the bond is 
between 11=Ba to 19=Caa and equal to zero if the rating for the bond is investment grade.  denotes the year fixed effect.  
denotes the matrix of control variables. The t-statistics are calculated using heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors. 
               *indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
  Price impact  Bid-ask spread   Trading activity  
Amihud RTC HW RPT #Trades Volume Zero 
Rating ( )  0.01***  0.02*** 0.03*** 0.02***  2.82*** 0.63** -0.02 
  (3.91)  (8.90) (6.16) (9.28)  (4.06) (2.55) (-0.10) 
Junk ( )  -0.02  0.07** 0.13** 0.06**  14.44*** 4.02** -9.74*** 
  (-0.70)  (2.53) (2.09) (2.26)  (2.86) (2.55) (-4.64) 
Junk (Rating-11)( )  0.03***  -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.04***  -2.49** 1.06** 0.10 
  (4.20)  (-7.25) (-4.52) (-6.63)  (-2.15) (2.24) (0.22) 
Intercept ( )  0.54***  0.42*** 1.22*** 0.42***  27.83** 0.46 32.58*** 
  (13.78)  (13.47) (17.38) (14.48)  (2.42) (0.11) (9.43) 
Controls  Y  Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Year fixed effect  Y  Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
# Bonds  3,478  3,379 3,082 2,450  3,478 3,478 3,478 
Obs  129,573  120,660 93,977 61,567  129,573 129,573 129,573 
Adjusted R2  0.21  0.20 0.36 0.16  0.32 0.37 0.37 
 50 
 
 
  Table 6: Panel regressions for liquidity proxies during three sub-periods 
This table reports coefficient estimates for monthly panel regressions of various liquidity proxies on credit rating 
dummies controlling for issue level and issuer level characteristics, over three sub-periods. Pre-crisis is the 
sample period from Jul. 2002 to Nov. 2007, crisis is the period from Dec. 2007 to June 2009, post-crisis is the 
period from July 2009 to Sep.2014. Dependent variables, rating dummies and control variables are similar to 
Table4. To save space, the coefficients for control variables are not reported in the table. 
  *indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates significance at    
the 1% level. 
 
 
  Price impact  Bid-ask spread   Trading activity  
Amihud RTC HW RPT #Trades Volume Zero 
Panel A: Pre-crisis period 
Aa/AA  -0.05  -0.05** -0.09* 0.01  -9.4** -4.2 -4.1* 
A  -0.04  -0.03 -0.07 0.03  3.5 -2.3 -4.9** 
Baa/BBB  0.02  0.08*** 0.11** 0.09***  14.0** 2.5 -1.2 
Ba/BB  0.12***  0.25*** 0.33*** 0.25***  21.5*** 4.7 -11.0*** 
B  0.12***  0.23*** 0.35*** 0.22***  21.2*** 7.8** -10.6*** 
Caa/CCC  0.11**  0.24*** 0.39*** 0.20***  54.5*** 40.9*** -22.2*** 
Ca/CC/C  0.59***  -0.01 0.13 0.01  22.4*** 16.1*** -9.8*** 
Intercept  0.26***  0.31*** 0.79*** 0.40***  29.5*** -6.9 44.3 
# Bonds  3,041  2,946 2,708 2,042  3,041 3,041 3,041 
Obs  80,033  72,639 57,788 29,777  80,033 80,033 80,033 
Adjusted R2  0.21  0.21 0.30 0.14  0.23 0.36 0.40 
Panel B: Crisis period 
Aa/AA  -0.08  -0.07 -0.10 0.02  -34.0 -5.0 0.05 
A  0.07  0.05 0.20** 0.10***  -20.4 0.5 -4.6 
Baa/BBB  0.19**  0.08 0.49*** 0.09***  -9.5 6.5 -3.2 
Ba/BB  0.25**  -0.14* 0.34 0.02  -0.7 8.5 -10.1* 
B  0.30***  -0.11* -0.19 0.03  0.8 14.0* -4.9 
Caa/CCC  0.59***  -0.21*** -0.01 -0.14**  33.3 22.3*** -18.0*** 
Ca/CC/C  0.90***  -0.18* -0.19 -0.17*  5.4 14.1 -11.7** 
Intercept  0.32**  0.24** 1.14*** 0.23***  -18.71 -37.6*** 49.3*** 
# Bonds  1,134  1,125 1,012 901  1,134 1,134 1,134 
Obs  12,772  12,351 9,133 7,221  12,772 12,772 12,772 
Adjusted R2  0.19  0.17 0.25 0.21  0.31 0.49 0.40 
Panel C: Post-crisis period 
Aa/AA  -0.11  -0.07 -0.60*** -0.03  24.27** -4.64 -9.80 
A  -0.11  -0.03 -0.59*** 0.00  12.47 -5.94 -8.62 
Baa/BBB  -0.09  0.04 -0.54*** 0.06  17.23** -2.89 -10.91* 
Ba/BB  -0.08  0.00 -0.48*** 0.06  60.23*** 5.54 -24.43*** 
B  -0.05  -0.08 -0.65*** -0.06  49.89*** 16.5*** -18.90*** 
Caa/CCC  0.01  -0.10 -0.75*** 0.01  76.02*** 18.3*** -18.17** 
Ca/CC/C  0.26***  -0.19** -0.66*** -0.12**  49.80*** 7.92 -12.55 
Intercept  0.59***  0.43*** 2.02*** 0.36***  40.53* 17.85** 41.91*** 
# Bonds  1,203  1,192 1,068 1,029  1,203 1,203 1,203 
Obs  36,768  35,670 27,056 24,569  36,768 36,768 36,768 
Adjusted R2  0.22  0.19 0.42 0.13  0.36 0.34 0.40 
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Table 7:  Parameters of Markov switching models for monthly liquidity and trading activity time series. 
This table reports the estimated parameters of the Markov switching models for monthly liquidity and trading activity time series 
and the proportion of each regime in each of the pre-crisis: Jul. 2002 to Nov. 2007, crisis: Dec. 2007 to June 2009, post-crisis: July 
2009 to June 2012, and regulatory period: Jul. 2012 to Sep.2014. Panel A shows these values for the aggregate market liquidity 
series and Panel B reports these values for the series obtained by calculating the spread between monthly HY and IG liquidity 
series. , show different regimes and is the persistence of each regime. The liquidity and trading 
activity variables have similar definitions as described in the text and the previous tables. 
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Panel A: Aggregate market monthly time series 
 Model parameters  Percentage of Sub-periods 
 
    
mean std persistence Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis Reg. 
Amihud 
0.08*** 0.75*** - 0.02 0.30 0.03 0.97  0% 0% 0% 96% 
0.12*** 0.75*** - 0.03 0.46 0.04 0.88  91% 26% 92% 4% 
0.21*** 0.75*** - 0.03 0.81 0.05 0.00  6% 16% 8% 0% 
 0.26*** 0.75*** - 0.14 1.02 0.20 0.90  3% 58% 0% 0% 
Model:  AR(1) with 4 regimes and constant  coefficients   AIC: -535.01    BIC: -495.17 
RTC 
    0.00 0.94*** - 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.04  31% 0% 31% 48% 
0.03** 0.94*** - 0.03 0.50 0.09 0.32  5% 53% 11% 0% 
0.03*** 0.94*** - 0.02 0.50 0.06 0.48  62% 11% 53% 56% 
0.10*** 0.94*** - 0.02 1.67 0.06 0.00  3% 37% 6% 0% 
Model:  AR(1) with  4 regimes and constant coefficients    AIC: -632.33    BIC: -592.50 
HW 
0.07*** 0.55*** 0.34*** 0.05 0.64 0.10 0.97  92% 16% 81% 100% 
0.25*** 0.55*** 0.34*** 0.21 2.27 0.40 0.87  8% 84% 19% 0% 
Model: AR(2) with 2 regimes and constant coefficients      AIC: -349.17    BIC:-317.35  
RPT 
0.01 0.55*** 0.41*** 0.03 0.25 0.09 0.95  98% 68% 97% 100% 
0.07*** 1.16*** -0.21*** 0.01 1.40 0.04 0.31  2% 32% 3% 0% 
Model: AR(2) with 2 regimes and switching coefficients    AIC: -618.19    BIC: -570.47 
Trades 
3.38*** 0.58*** 0.25*** 2.07 19.88 3.37 0.99  98% 0% 0% 12% 
9.27*** 0.58*** 0.25*** 5.99 54.53 9.76 0.99  2% 100% 100% 88% 
Model: AR(2) with 2 regimes and constant coefficients      AIC: 810.14      BIC: 841.95 
Volume 
2.54*** 0.53*** 0.17** 1.32 8.41 1.74 0.59  80% 42% 28% 48% 
2.33 0.54*** 0.44*** 3.29 99.50 13.83 0.63  20% 58% 72% 52% 
Model: AR(2) with 2 regimes and  switching coefficients      AIC: 742.24     BIC:789.96 
Zero 
2.75** 0.96*** - 0.92 68.75 3.29 0.98  51% 84% 100% 100% 
94.27*** -0.23 - 2.22 76.64 2.28 0.96  49% 16% 0% 0% 
Model: AR(1) with 2 regimes and  switching coefficients    AIC: 481.23     BIC:513.10 
%RPT 
-0.03 0.67*** 0.31*** 1.83 -1.50 8.05 0.80  0% 0% 0% 20% 
0.33 0.67*** 0.31*** 0.90 16.50 3.96 0.99  100% 100% 100% 80% 
Model: AR(2) with 2 regimes and constant  coefficients       AIC: 407.89     BIC: 439.71 
%Interdealer 
30.6*** - - 6.84 30.6 6.84 0.99  100% 95% 0% 0% 
46.6*** - - 1.94 46.6 1.94 0.99  0% 5% 100% 100% 
Model: Intercept model with two regimes    AIC: 825.4923     BIC: 841.454 
% Block Vol. 
6.61 - - 1.03 6.61 1.03 0.99  100% 100% 3% 0% 
8.41 - - 1.18 8.41 1.18 0.98  0% 0% 97% 100% 
Model:  Intercept model with two regimes    AIC: 465.42    BIC: 481.38 
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Panel B: IG-HY monthly time series 
 Model parameters  Percentage of Sub-periods 
 
    
mean std persistence Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis Reg. 
Amihud 
0.09*** 0.37*** - 0.06 0.14 0.00 0.98  82% 5% 86% 100% 
0.33*** 0.09 - 0.15 0.36 0.02 0.96  18% 95% 14% 0% 
Model:  AR(1) with 2 regimes and switching  coefficients   AIC: -310.97    BIC: -279.105 
RTC 
-0.05** 0.59*** 0.37*** 0.08 -1.25 0.06 0.64  26% 42% 8% 24% 
-0.002 0.59*** 0.37*** 0.04 -0.05 0.02 0.76  49% 47% 67% 56% 
0.09*** 0.59*** 0.37*** 0.05 2.25 0.02 0.00  25% 11% 25% 20% 
Model:  AR(2) with  3 regimes and constant coefficients    AIC: -335.78    BIC: -296.014 
HW 
-0.62 - - 0.43 -0.62 0.43 0.94  0% 63% 17% 0% 
0.25 - - 0.11 0.25 0.11 0.91  40% 11% 42% 0% 
 0.49 - - 0.13 0.49 0.13 0.97  60% 26% 42% 100% 
Model: Intercept model with 3 regimes       AIC: -105.57    BIC:-81.63 
RPT 
-0.03*** 0.55*** 0.33*** 0.05 -0.25 0.01 0.64  74% 95% 83% 64% 
0.06 0.55*** 0.33*** 0.09 0.50 0.03 0.35  26% 5% 17% 36% 
Model: AR(2) with 2 regimes and constant coefficients       AIC: -326.73   BIC: -294.91 
Trades 
-0.67 0.69*** 0.19** 3.08 -5.58 35.87 0.97  86% 37% 3% 12% 
-0.51 0.69*** 0.19** 11.79 -4.25 525.6 0.97  14% 63% 97% 88% 
Model: AR(2) with 2 regimes and constant coefficients       AIC: 986.40     BIC: 1018.21 
Volume 
-0.87 0.80*** -    5.86 -4.34 95.25 0.87  51% 47% 83% 56% 
-0.15 0.80*** - 2.81 -0.75 21.95 0.81  49% 53% 17% 44% 
Model: AR(1) with 2 regimes and  constant coefficients      AIC: 877.75     BIC: 901.66 
Zero 
0.12 0.85*** - 1.12 0.80 4.52 0.74  78% 47% 86% 76% 
0.18 0.85*** - 1.78 1.20 11.42 0.68  22% 53% 14% 24% 
Model: AR(1) with 2 regimes and  constant coefficients      AIC: 528.96     BIC: 552.87 
%RPT 
7.69 - - 2.39 7.69 2.39 0.99  0% 47% 100% 100% 
18.49 - - 1.59 18.49 1.59 0.98  100% 52% 0% 0% 
Model: Intercept model with 2 regimes       AIC: 645.82     BIC: 661.78 
%Interdealer 
-1.63 - - 2.3 -1.63 2.3 0.98  63% 100% 22% 0% 
3.73 - - 2.6 3.73 2.6 0.99  37% 0% 78% 100% 
Model: Intercept model with 2 regimes     AIC: 698.55     BIC: 714.51 
% Block Vol. 
-2.01 - - 2.08 -2.01 2.08 0.99  98% 53% 42% 100% 
2.14 - - 3.61 2.14 3.61 0.96  2% 47% 58% 0% 
Model: Intercept model with 2 regimes      AIC: 686.99    BIC: 702.96 
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ABSTRACT 
 
 This paper studies the impact of credit rating changes on corporate bonds 
transaction costs, and the determinants of abnormal illiquidity during short windows 
around the rating announcements in normal versus distressed market conditions. Our 
findings suggest decreased (increased) liquidity around downgrades (upgrades) 
announcements, with relatively stronger effects around downgrades. Higher levels of 
cumulative abnormal illiquidity (CAIL) are observed over the ten days window 
following the event for fallen angel and multi-level downgrades. Downgrades exhibit 
stronger negative effect on the Amihud price impact measure for bonds during the 
financial crisis, but there is no evidence of similar crisis effect for bid-ask spreads. 
Finally, trading activity as well as bond and issuer characteristics affect CAIL around 
the rating events. 
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1. Introduction 
Credit rating agencies play a substantial role in financial markets by providing 
opinions about the creditworthiness of bond issuers as well as the default risk of 
particular issues. Several bond market regulations designed to restrict risk taking by 
financial institutions are based on credit ratings. Campbell and Taksler (2003) 
highlight that institutions subject to rating based restrictions on their holdings own 
more than half of all corporate bonds. Therefore a change in credit rating of a bond 
from one scale to another has relevant implications for most bondholders and potential 
buyers in terms of their portfolio allocation decisions and capital requirements. In 
particular, downgrades that move the bonds out of the investment grade category can 
elicit selling pressure or even fire sale of the fallen angels by at least a segment of the 
market as demonstrated by Ellul, et al. (2011).  
While the information content of credit rating announcements and the impact of 
rating changes on stock and bond prices have been the subject of several studies (e.g. 
Hand et al., 1992; Kliger and Sarig, 2000; May, 2010 among others), the impact of 
rating changes on corporate bonds liquidity and trading activity is not well understood. 
Kim and Verrecchia (1994) predict that stock liquidity deteriorates around the time 
new information is released to the market and returns to normal afterwards. The price 
pressure typically do not last for more than a few days in the equity market, but the 
impact of rating changes on corporate bonds liquidity are likely to be larger and more 
persistent.   
This paper explores the impact of credit rating changes on corporate bonds 
liquidity around the announcement date. We follow an event study approach 
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appropriate for corporate bond market in the spirit of Bessembinder et al. (2009), May 
(2010) and Ellul et al. (2011) to measure abnormal (il)liquidity around the rating 
events.  
Previous research in this area is mainly focused on price pressure and trading 
activity around the fallen angel downgrades.  For example Ellul et al. (2011) 
investigates fire sales of downgraded corporate bonds induced by regulatory 
constraints imposed on insurance companies. They find that insurance companies that 
are relatively more constrained by regulations are more likely to sell downgraded 
bonds. Moreover, they find that while many bonds do not exhibit a strong price 
response to the downgrade, in general those bonds subject to a high probability of 
regulatory induced selling show significant price declines and subsequent reversals. 
The price effects appear larger during periods in which insurance companies as a 
group are relatively more distressed and when other potential buyers’ capital is 
relatively scarce. 
Ambrose, Cai and Helwege (2012) also examine the trading activity when investment 
grade bonds are downgraded to junk status. Based on a sample of insurance 
companies, Ambrose, Cai and Helwege (2012) suggest that while insurance 
companies are more active in selling fallen angels following downgrades, these 
increased sales only account for a small portion of their overall fallen angel holdings. 
They argue that it is unlikely that any regulations or internal policies require these 
institutions to sell their holdings of fallen angels immediately after downgrade, as 
selling at fire sale price may have more adverse consequences for the firm.   
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In case of a bankruptcy or default event, Jankowitsch et al. (2014) document 
temporary high trading activity and price pressure on the default event day itself 
exclusively. Wang and Han (2015) also find an increase in abnormal bid-ask spreads 
around default.  
Unlike many previous studies, we do not restrict our analyses to fallen angels 
downgrades. Instead, we study the impact of downgrades and upgrades across all 
ratings but allow for possible non-linear liquidity effect of rating changes within 
investment grade vs. high yield range as well as the asymmetric effect of downgrades 
vs. upgrades. We then study the cross sectional determinants of abnormal illiquidity 
around credit rating changes. Our relatively long sample period allows the 
examination of effects in both normal economic conditions as well as the crisis period.  
Overall, the results suggest asymmetric findings:  While downgrades significantly 
affect the bond liquidity around announcement date for all measures of liquidity, 
significant results for upgrades are only found for the Amihud measure but not for bid-
ask spread measures. Examining mean and median cumulative abnormal illiquidity 
(CAIL) over several windows around the rating announcement date shows a positive 
and significant abnormal illiquidity associated with credit rating downgrades and 
negative abnormal illiquidity around upgrades.17 Consistent with the previous 
literature on the impact of rating changes on stock and bond returns, we find 
asymmetric impact for upgrades vs. downgrades on trading costs where the effect of 
upgrades is much smaller than the effect of downgrades (Holthausen and Leftwich, 
                                                 
17While Kim and Verrecchia (1994) suggests that liquidity deteriorates around the time new information 
is released to the market and returns to normal a few days afterwards, the impact of rating changes on 
corporate bonds liquidity are likely to be larger and more persistent, so we use a variety of longer 
windows in our study.  
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1986; Hand et. al. 1992). Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) argue that rating agencies 
allocate more resources to revealing negative credit information than positive 
information because the loss of reputation is more severe when a false rating is too 
high than when it is too low. As a result downgrades represent information not yet 
known by the market, whereas upgrades confirm information that is already available. 
Moreover, the downgrades may trigger forced selling or fire sales whereas the 
upgrades are not followed by forced buying. These heterogeneous trading patterns 
around downgrades and upgrades may cause different behavior of liquidity proxies in 
terms of their magnitude around downgrades and upgrades. 
Interestingly, the mean CAIL is positive and significant prior to the downgrade 
announcement date, which suggests that downgrade events are at least partially 
anticipated by the market. This result, which is consistent with the previous literature, 
may either be due to advance notice of potential downgrades by inclusion in the watch 
list of credit rating agencies well before the actual downgrade date or a result of 
delayed rating changes by credit rating agencies based on their through-the-cycle 
approach, as in Altman and Rijken (2006). 
The results also suggest a heterogeneous effect of rating changes across the 
investment grade and high yield boundary. Downgrades from investment grade to high 
yield have stronger and more persistent adverse impact on abnormal illiquidity both in 
terms of price impact and bid-ask spreads, whereas upgrades to investment grade have 
more muted and transitory impact. Downgrades to high yield category may impose a 
selling pressure on financial institutions such as insurance companies and pension 
funds, while providing an opportunity for less restricted investors such as hedge funds 
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and high yield mutual funds to buy these securities at deep discounts (Fridson and 
Cherry, 1992, Fridson and Sterling, 2006 and Dor and Xu, 2011).  The selling pressure 
accompanied by the “slow moving capital” coming to the market by these new 
investors leads to a shallow market for fallen angels around the downgrade event. We 
also find that the positive impact of downgrades on abnormal illiquidity is more 
pronounced for downgrades within the investment grade category compared to the 
downgrades within the high yield category.  
Analyzing the rating changes in normal versus crisis period shows that while the 
negative impact of downgrades is stronger during the financial crisis, no significant 
impact for upgrades are observed during this period; however, since the number of 
upgrades during the crisis is much lower compared to normal times, this result should 
be interpreted with caution.  
The cross sectional determinants of abnormal illiquidity suggest that the adverse 
effect of downgrades on bond liquidity is more severe for downgrades of more than 
one step, and downgrades that simultaneously affect several bonds of the same firm. 
Bonds with larger issue size experience significantly better liquidity around rating 
events. Sectors matter: bonds issued by financial and utility firms experience worse 
liquidity conditions in the event of a downgrade. The selling pressure around rating 
change events exacerbates the adverse impact of downgrades on liquidity , and higher 
trading volume around both downgrades and upgrades significantly improves the 
liquidity as defined by market depth and bid-ask spreads. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the sample of 
rating changes and summary statistics, Section 3 describes the liquidity measures used 
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in this study, Section 4 describes the event study methodology, Section 5 explains and 
discusses the event study results, Section 6 examines the cross sectional determinants 
of abnormal (il)liquidity around the rating events and section 7 concludes. 
2. Sample of rating changes 
To construct the event study sample, we use FISD to identify rating changes by 
Moody’s, S&P and Fitch from July 2002 to September 2014. We exclude bonds that 
are denominated in a currency other than US dollar or have a foreign issuer, variable 
rate and zero coupon bonds, bonds that have credit enhancement, convertibles, asset-
backed, callable, putable, exchangeable, fungible, preferred, tendered, and bonds that 
are part of a unit deal are excluded from the sample. Following May (2010), we also 
require bond’s maturity date to be at least one year from its rating change date. In the 
event of multiple rating changes within five days interval, only the earliest rating 
change is included. If bonds of the same firm are downgraded (upgraded) on same day 
by more than one rating agency, only one agency’s rating change is included 
according to the following priority: Moody’s, S&P and Fitch. We also exclude the 
downgrades where the new rating is below Caa/CCC. Since these downgrades are very 
likely to be concurrent with the firm’s default, there are more likely to be associated 
with other simultaneous events and information as pointed out by May (2010). We 
also exclude the upgrades where the old rating is below Caa/CCC to have symmetric 
downgrades and upgrades samples. Applying these filters result in a sample of 7,903 
bond rating changes (5,373 downgrades and 2,530 upgrades). At the firm level, these 
represent 4,043 rating change events (2,613 downgrades and 1,430 upgrades).  
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To keep bonds with the sufficient number of trades in the event study sample, we 
require that bonds trade on at least 10 days during the entire sample period and also 
similar in spirit to Ellul et al.  (2011)’s  procedure, we require that bonds trade on at 
least 1 day before Day , one day between Days  to 0, one day between Days 
0 and , and one day after Day from the event. After imposing these 
restrictions, the final sample consists of 5,137 observations at the issue level (3,581 
downgrades and 1,556 upgrades). Among these observations, 627 bonds trade on less 
than 10 days during the  window. 363 bonds trade on less than 5 days 
during the  window and 25 bonds are traded only once during the same 
window. At firm level, the final sample includes 2780 unique rating change events 
(1855 downgrades and 925 upgrades). 
Table 8 shows the bond level distribution of rating changes by rating agency and 
different rating change characteristics. There are a total of 3,581 downgrades and 
1,556 upgrades in our sample. Panel A shows the distribution of rating changes by 
calendar year. The number of downgrades in 2004 to 2007 is generally less than in 
2002 or 2003. Downgrades are particularly rare during 2007 right before the financial 
crisis. The number of downgrades surges during crisis period of 2008 and 2009, but 
then resumes to a level as small as, or smaller than before the crisis. The 1,184 
downgrades that exist in our sample during 2008-2009 constitute 33% of all sample 
downgrades. The highest number of upgrades observed in a single year is 266 which 
belong to 2007 after which the number of upgrades decreases sharply during the crisis 
period. Higher number of upgrades is observed in the years following the financial 
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crisis. The smaller number of Fitch rating changes compared to the other agencies is 
due to lower market share of Fitch.  
Panel B shows the distribution by size of the rating change. Almost all 
downgrades (72%) and upgrades (82%) in the sample are just by one grade.  Among 
the credit rating agencies, Fitch appears to have the highest percentage of downgrades 
and upgrades by more than two grades. 12.1% of Fitch downgrades are by three or 
more notches and 12.9% of its upgrades are by three or more notches. In general larger 
size of rating changes is slightly more common for downgrades than for upgrades.  
Panel C of Table 8 shows the sample distribution by pre-downgrade and pre-
upgrade letter rating class. Over a third of downgrades (38.4%) and upgrades (39.8%) 
in the sample are from A letter rating class. Panel D shows the number of rating 
changes across the investment grade boundary. In total, the sample includes 305 
downgrades from investment grade to non-investment grade (8.5% of downgrades) 
and 123 upgrades from non-investment grade to investment grade (7.9% of upgrades) 
in the sample.  
3. Liquidity measures 
In this study, the illiquidity is proxied by Amihud (2002) measure and a roundtrip 
cost measure (RTC)18. The Amihud measure is from Amihud (2002).  The daily 
Amihud measure is calculated as the average ratio of absolute return to the trade size 
of consecutive transactions during a day: 
                                                 
18 Hong and Warga (HW) measure is also examined, however since the results were qualitatively 
similar to that of RTC, we haven’t reported them for brevity. 
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where  is the number of trades of bond i on day t, and  are the prices for 
two consecutive trades (j - 1th and jth), for bond i on day t. is the size of the jth 
trade for bond i. At least two transactions are required on a given day to calculate the 
measure. A larger Amihud measure indicates higher price impact in response to a 
given volume of trading and reflects higher illiquidity. 
Roundtrip cost (RTC): We develop a roundtrip cost measure in the spirit of 
Feldhütter (2012). Feldhütter defines bond trades to be part of an imputed roundtrip 
transaction (IRT) if two or three trades for a given volume occur within fifteen 
minutes. Because the buy/sell indicator is not available in the TRACE data for the 
majority of his study period, he assumes the highest price to be an investor buying 
from a dealer, the lowest price to be an investor selling to a dealer and the investor 
roundtrip cost to be the highest minus the lowest price. We modify this measure using 
buy/sell indicators in the following way: First, we identify multiple transactions for the 
same bond on the same day and same volume. Based on this definition 1,897,735 IRTs 
exist in our sample. 5,518,173, transactions out of 7,988,736 are part of an IRT that 
form around 69% of total observations. These transaction groups are either B/S: 
include at least a customer buy and a customer sell transaction, D/B: Include only 
customer buy and interdealer transactions, S/D: include only customer sell and 
interdealer transactions, B: Include only customer buy transactions, S: Include only 
customer sell transactions, D: Include only interdealer transactions. Next, we calculate 
roundtrip cost using the first three types in the following way: 
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Where  is the mean customer buy price (Ask) and bid is the mean customer 
sell price and  is the mean interdealer price. Finally the daily roundtrip cost for 
each bond is calculated as the average of all roundtrip costs for that bond during that 
day. 
We examine the distribution of IRTs across various trade sizes to test the 
representativeness of the measure for the entire sample and identify the potential 
biases. Panel A of Table 9 shows the distribution of all transactions as well as 
transactions that are part of an IRT across different size groups. As we can see, more 
than 78% of all transactions in our sample are retail sized trades defined as trades 
below $100,000. Around 74% of retail sized transactions and around 51% of 
institutional sized trades are part of an IRT. Only 47% of trades above $1,000,000 are 
part of an IRT. These percentages imply that retail sized trades are more likely to be 
part of an IRT which may cause an upward bias in our measure of bid-ask spreads. 
Panel B of Table 9 shows the distribution of various types of transaction groups across 
trading size groups. We can see that among all size groups D/B trades have a higher 
percentage compared to other types of trades.  
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4. Methodology 
The event study methodology used in this study is similar in spirit to the 
procedures used by Bessembinder et al. (2009), May (2010) and Ellul et al. (2011). 
We use a matching portfolio model to calculate the abnormal bond illiquidity around 
rating changes. In order to control for market fluctuations in computing abnormal 
bond illiquidity, we use issues available in Enhanced TRACE data to construct 
illiquidity indices for each rating class that contain sufficient number of observations 
with non-missing illiquidity proxies.   
The median numbers of bonds per issuer in our sample is 1. However around 43% 
of firms have more than one bond present in the sample with the maximum number 
being 26 bonds issued by General Electric Capital. This suggests a skewed distribution 
with a large number of firms having only one bond outstanding in the rating change 
sample, and a small number of firms with much more issues outstanding. This would 
cause the firms with larger number of bonds outstanding being over represented 
(Bessembinder et al., 2009). Moreover, usually several bonds of the same firm are 
downgraded on the same calendar date resulting in a clustered data with overlapping 
event windows. This clustering biases the standard errors downward because of the 
likely high correlation among bonds from the same firm, violating the assumption of 
independent observations and leading to inflated t-statistic (See Bernard 1987, 
Eberhart and Siddique, 2002 among others). To address these issues, we compute firm 
level abnormal illiquidity and treat each firm level rating change as a single 
observation.  We compute the daily abnormal bond illiquidity as the raw illiquidity 
minus the contemporaneous illiquidity on an index of matched corporate bonds:  
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ILLIQI tILLIQtILLIQtAB _                 (3) 
Where on day t,  is the abnormal bond illiquidity,  is the bond 
illiquidity and is the illiquidity of a value-weighted index of matched 
corporate bonds that did not experience a rating change in the period between Day 
 to Day .  
The Enhanced TRACE is used to construct the matched corporate bond indices. 
We use Dick-Nielsen (2014) procedure to clean the Enhanced TRACE data and 
eliminate same day corrections and cancellations, reversals, agency transactions where 
the principal transaction has the same price as the agency transaction and one of the 
reports in each interdealer transaction pair. We also exclude special transactions such 
as trades which are not secondary market, trades under special circumstances, 
commissioned transactions, odd number of days to settlement, automatic give up 
trades, non-cash sales. Furthermore, following Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2007) 
approach, we apply 20% median and 50% return reversal filter to eliminate outliers. 
The final Enhanced TRACE sample consists of 86,450,187 observations for 87,159 
bonds. 
The matching criteria is based on seven letter classifications using Moody’s 
ratings and if unrated by Moody’s, S&P rating of matched corporate bonds. These 
classifications include Aaa/AAA, Aa/AA, A, Baa/BBB, Ba/BB, B and Caa/CCC. To 
control for market-wide changes of the term structure, we divide the rating classes 
except Aaa and Caa into two maturity groups with the cutoff maturity being 4 years. 
Aaa/AAA and Caa/CCC classes are not divided by maturity due to much smaller 
number of traded bonds in these classes. The cutoff threshold is chosen in a way that, 
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within a letter rating class, there is approximately the same number of matched bonds 
in each group.  
For each of the twelve bond indices, we compute the daily illiquidity for each day 
in the sample period as the mean of daily illiquidity across all bonds in the index that 
are traded in that day. To be included in a given index on each day, the bond should be 
traded on that day. For firms with more than one bond downgraded/upgraded on the 
same date, we aggregate abnormal bond illiquidity by firm and consider each firm 
level rating change as a single observation. Abnormal illiquidity for firm j on day t is 
computed as: 
                     


N
i
i,tj,t
ILLIQAB_
N
ILLIQAB_
1
1
           (4) 
Where N is the number of bond issues in the sample for firm j. For a multiple day 
window, cumulative abnormal illiquidity (CAILs) is computed as the sum of the 
firm’s daily abnormal bond illiquidity over the window.  
5. Event study results 
In this section, we test the impact of credit rating changes on corporate bonds 
illiquidity over several windows around the announcement date. The illiquidity is 
proxied by a price impact measure (Amihud) and a bid-ask spread measure (RTC). We 
study the impact over two pre-event windows and three post event windows: 
, and .  
Panel A of Table 10 shows the impact of downgrades using the entire sample. We 
compute both mean cumulative abnormal illiquidity (mean CAIL) and median 
cumulative abnormal illiquidity (median CAIL) for the events windows. The number 
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of observations used to calculate mean and median CAIL for each window is also 
reported. To test the statistical significance, we use t-test and signed-rank test for mean 
CAIL and sign test for median CAIL. 
The results in Table 10 show that the mean CAIL is positive and significant prior 
to the downgrade date for both Amihud and RTC measures which implies that the 
rating change is anticipated by the market. Some previous studies have shown that 
credit rating agencies are relatively delayed in their rating decisions and a number of 
explanations have been provided by the literature for this phenomenon, including the 
rating stability hypothesis, reputation hypothesis and through-the-cycle as opposed to 
point-in-time approach of the credit rating agencies (Cantor (2001), Löffler(2005) and 
Altman and Rijken (2006)). However the magnitudes of mean and median CAIL are 
greater for the windows following the downgrade. These results indicate that there is a 
significant increase in the abnormal illiquidity associated with credit rating 
downgrade.  
Next, we investigate whether there is a heterogeneous effect of rating changes 
within investment grade (IG) as opposed to rating changes within high yield (HY) 
category. Panel B of Table 10 reports the impact of downgrades within the investment 
grade category and Panel C shows the impact of downgrades within high yield range. 
Interestingly, the mean and median CAIL over all event windows are larger for IG 
downgrades vs. HY downgrades both for Amihud and RTC measures.  The impact of 
HY downgrades on bonds’ liquidity over most event windows, are insignificant. In 
general the mean and median cumulative abnormal illiquidity are positive but mostly 
insignificant around the rating event when a non-investment grade bond is further 
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downgraded. Particularly the mean and median CAIL over  window for 
HY downgrades are small (even slightly negative for RTC measure) which may imply 
that the impact is more transitory for the downgrades within the non-investment grade 
range.  
These results may imply that downgrades of investment grade bonds are more 
consequential for the institutional investors holding them, as the downgrades may 
cause their portfolios to violate certain risk limits imposed by regulations or they may 
be indicative of the possibility that the bond will be soon downgraded to junk status. 
While the investors in high yield bonds such as high yield mutual funds and hedge 
funds may not share similar concerns. However since the number of observations are 
also much lower for downgrades within high yield range, we should take caution when 
interpreting these results. 
Panel D of Table 10 shows the impact of downgrades that moves the firm out of 
(in to) the investment grade category. Both mean and median CAIL for fallen angel 
downgrades are positive and larger compared to either IG or HY downgrades. This 
evidence strongly highlights the role of regulations that prohibit financial institutions 
from holding non-investment grade bonds.  These regulatory constraints may lead to 
forced selling of fallen angels by at least a segment of the market as demonstrated by 
Ellul, et al. (2011), and at the same time prevent other institutional investors from 
buying these bonds.  
This situation also provides an opportunity for hedge funds and high yield mutual 
funds to buy the downgraded bonds at prices significantly below fundamental values 
(Fridson and Sterling, 2006).  The selling pressure accompanied by the “slow moving 
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capital” coming to the market by these new investors leads to a shallow market for 
fallen angels around the downgrade event.19Ellul et al. (2011) found that insurance 
companies that are relatively more constrained by regulations are more likely to sell 
downgraded bonds and those bonds subject to a high probability of regulatory induced 
selling show significant price declines and subsequent reversals, particularly when 
insurance companies as a group are relatively more distressed and when other 
potential buyers’ capital is relatively scarce. 
Table 11 examines the effect of upgrades announcements on bonds’ liquidity. The 
results from Panel A generally show negative mean and median CAIL around 
upgrades for both Amihud and RTC measures. However the results for RTC measures 
are mostly insignificants except for the  window. The magnitude of impact 
is also much smaller compared to the impact of downgrades for both Amihud and 
RTC measures.  
In general, the results for upgrades are much smaller and less significant than 
those for downgrades. These results are in line with asymmetric market impact of 
downgrades and upgrades found in some prior studies (for example Holthausen and 
Leftwich (1986) and Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich (1992)). Similar to downgrade 
events, Panel B and C of Table 11 show that the impact of IG upgrades on bond 
liquidity is generally larger and more significant compared to that of HY upgrades 
except for  window. Panel D of Table 11 shows that when the firm is 
upgraded from non-investment grade to investment grade we observe a negative 
abnormal illiquidity round the announcement date. For Amihud measure the impact is 
                                                 
19 See Duffie (2010) for more explanation regarding slow moving capital hypothesis. 
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only significant for post-event windows of  and .However, for 
the RTC measure the impact is not significant for any of the windows. 
Panel A of Figure 6 compares the impact of IG downgrades, HY downgrades and 
fallen angel downgrades over  days around the downgrade announcement 
date. This graph clearly demonstrates that fallen angel downgrades have more adverse 
impact on bond liquidity around the event compared to downgrades within either 
investment grade or high yield categories, emphasizing the role of restrictive 
regulations for holding high yield bonds by institutional investors. Panel B of Figure 6 
shows similar results for upgrade events. In general the impact of upgrades on 
liquidity is much smaller; however the upgrades that move the bond from HY to IG 
category appear to have slightly larger impact. 
Next, we study how the impact of rating changes on corporate bonds liquidity 
varies during normal economic conditions as opposed to crisis period. We split the 
sample to two subsample based on the economic conditions: Normal and Crisis. The 
Normal subsample covers the time period from the beginning of the sample (July 
2002) to November 2007 and from July 2009 to September 2014. The crisis 
subsample starts from December 2007 and ends in June 2009. Table 12 shows the 
results of these analyses. Panel A shows the impact of downgrades during the normal 
economy and Panel B shows the impact of downgrades during the crisis period. 
Interestingly, we observe that the two liquidity measures seem to behave differently 
during normal vs. crisis period: For Amihud measure both mean and median CAIL 
around downgrades are larger for the crisis period over all studied event windows, 
indicating that downgrades have severe adverse impact on market depth for 
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downgraded bonds during the crisis period. On the other hand, for bid-ask spread as 
measured by RTC, although the mean CAIL is still significant over all windows 
during the crisis period, the magnitude of impact appears to be smaller, compared to 
the normal period, for all event windows.  
Panel C and D of Table 12 show the mean and median CAIL for upgrades in 
normal and crisis period. Interestingly, while we observe a negative and significant 
impact around upgrades during the normal economy, the significance disappears for 
the crisis period sample. In other words during the financial crisis upgrades didn’t help 
improving liquidity of upgraded bonds around announcement date. However since the 
number of upgrades during the crisis period is very small, we should take caution in 
interpreting the latter results. Generally the impact of upgrades reported in Panel C 
and D are less significant for RTC measure compared to Amihud measure. Figure 7 
also shows the cumulative abnormal illiquidity (CAIL) using Amihud as illiquidity 
proxy, during [-20, +20] days around the rating change announcements, confirming 
the results obtained in Table 12.  
 We also examine the number of trades and volume. Figure 8 shows the trading 
activity over [-20, +20] days around downgrades and upgrades. First we can observe 
that the average number of trades per day is higher around downgrade announcements 
compared to upgrade announcements for all types of trade (buy, sell and interdealer). 
Second, we can see that generally the number of trades doesn’t appear to change much 
on the event date compared to the days prior to announcement which may imply that 
the rating event is anticipated by the market prior to actual announcement. However 
the average daily number of sell trades seems to increase during the  
 74 
 
window from downgrade announcement showing that the downgrades impose a 
selling pressure on the market to some extent. However, there is no evidence of fire 
sales following downgrades.  Ambrose, Cai and Helwege (2012) also find that while 
the insurance companies are more active in selling fallen angels following rating 
downgrade but these increased sales only accounts for a small portion of their overall 
holdings of fallen angels. We can also observe that the average trading volume per day 
increases around 5 days prior to the event and starts to decline gradually after 6 days 
from the announcement date. However, similar results are not observed around 
upgrade announcements. 
6. Determinants of bond abnormal illiquidity around rating events 
The analysis presented in this section, identifies the determinants of corporate 
bond’s abnormal illiquidity around rating change events. The dependent variable in all 
regressions is mean CAIL over  window using Amihud (CAIL (Amihud)) and 
RTC (CAIL (RTC)) as illiquidity proxies.  
Table 13 reports the results of these analyses for downgrade events. We use 
Crisis dummy as an independent variable to test whether the impact of rating events 
on market liquidity of affected bonds is different in normal versus crisis period. The 
results are very different among regressions with CAIL (Amihud) vs. CAIL (RTC) as 
dependent variables. In particular, our results show that the negative impact of 
downgrades on bond liquidity (positive impact of downgrades on CAIL (Amihud)) 
was stronger during the recent financial crisis. However, we observe no significant 
crisis effect when the RTC bid-ask spread measure is used as illiquidity measure. In 
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other words, results imply that the abnormal bid-ask spreads around downgrades were 
not significantly affected during crisis period whereas abnormal price impact of trades 
around downgrades became significantly larger. These findings confirm the results 
obtained in Table 12. 
We also define as a dummy variable equal to 1, if CAIL 
over  window is positive and 0 otherwise, to control for bond abnormal 
iliquidity prior to the announcement date. The coefficients for this variable are highly 
significant indicating that bonds with positive CAIL prior to the event date have 
higher abnormal illiquidity over 10 days from the downgrade announcement. Table 13 
also provides evidence that the size of downgrade affects the magnitude of CAIL 
around downgrade event. The effect is more significant for Amihud measure. Also 
consistent with our prior findings in Table 10, the adverse effect of downgrades on 
liquidity is more severe when they cross the investment grade boundary. 
We further control for bond old rating prior to rating change, by including two 
dummy variables, namely: Old rating: Baa (1 if bonds old rating is in Baa/BBB rating 
class and 0 otherwise) and Old rating: HY (1 if bonds old rating is between Ba1/BB+, 
Caa3/CCC- and 0 otherwise). The benchmark group is Aaa/AAA, A3/A- ratings. 
Interestingly, the coefficients for Old rating: HY is negative and significant in most of 
the settings, indicating that the liquidity of high yield bonds that are further 
downgraded are less affected around the downgrade announcement date compared to 
the bonds that belong to the benchmark group. This finding is consistent with the 
previous results from Table 10. Furthermore, the results show that if more bonds of 
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the same firm are simultaneously affected by the downgrade, the CAIL around 
downgrade event will be larger.  
Next, we examine the effect of trading activity on abnormal illiquidity around 
rating events. The results from Table 13 show a positive and significant coefficient for 
#customer sell variable particularly for regressions with CAIL (Amihud) as dependent 
variable. This result implies that a selling pressure around the downgrade 
announcement date will push up the abnormal price impact of trades which is 
consistent with our expectations.20 On the other hand, the results show that an increase 
in average trading volume leads to a significant decrease in abnormal transaction costs 
(bid-ask spread) around downgrades. We can also observe that bonds with larger issue 
size enjoy better liquidity both in terms of price impact and bid-ask spread around 
downgrade events. Also bonds with higher coupon rates and bonds that are issued by 
utility firms tend to have higher abnormal bid-ask spread around default.  
Table 14 shows the determinants of cumulative abnormal illiquidity (CAIL) 
around upgrade events. For upgrades the coefficients of crisis variable is insignificant 
in all settings implying that the abnormal illiquidity around upgrade events are not 
significantly changed during the crisis period comparing to the normal economic 
conditions. Also the coefficients for 𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐿(−20,−10)<0 dummy variable are negative 
and significant indicating that bonds with negative CAIL prior to the event date 
experience lower abnormal illiquidity over 10 days from the downgrade 
announcement. Upgrades that move the bond in to the investment grade category 
significantly decrease the abnormal Amihud around upgrade event. However they 
                                                 
20
#customer sell  is defined as is the average number of daily customer sells  across all the bonds of the 
firm that are affected by the rating change over the [0,+10] days window around rating event. 
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have no significant impact on abnormal bid-ask spread around upgrade. The negative 
and significant coefficients of “Old rating: HY” in column 6 and 7 show that upgrades 
from high yield category are associated with lower abnormal transaction costs around 
the announcement. We can also observe that higher average trading volume is 
associated with lower abnormal illiquidity around upgrade events. The coefficients for 
bond and firm characteristics generally show similar signs as in Tanble9. In particular 
bonds with larger issue size enjoy better liquidity around upgrades and bonds with 
higher age experience lower liquidity (higher CAIL (Amihud)) during the ten days 
after the upgrade announcement. 
7. Conclusion 
This study examines the impact of rating changes on bond’s liquidity around the 
announcement date. The results generally show positive and significant cumulative 
abnormal illiquidity (CAIL) around downgrades and negative CAIL around upgrades. 
Consistent with prior literature, we find smaller and less significant impact for 
upgrades. We also find that the negative impact of downgrades on liquidity is more 
severe for fallen angel downgrades. Moreover, our findings suggest larger impact for 
downgrades and upgrades within investment grade category compared to rating 
changes within the high yield range. Analyzing the trading activity around rating 
changes show that downgrades elicit more trades (buy, sell and interdealer) compared 
to upgrades. There is a modest evidence of selling pressure after the downgrade date 
and an increase in trading volume around the downgrade announcements. 
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We also study the determinants of abnormal illiquidity around the rating change 
announcement. The results show that downgrades that occurred during the financial 
crisis are associated with higher abnormal illiquidity in terms of price impact (as 
measured by Amihud) but not bid-ask spreads. Moreover, the results show that 
downgrades of larger size, fallen angel downgrades and downgrades that 
simultaneously affected several bonds of the same firm have more adverse impact on 
liquidity around announcement. Selling pressure around rating event exacerbates the 
negative impact of downgrade on liquidity, and higher trading volume around the 
event is associated with lower CAIL both around downgrades and upgrades. Bonds 
with larger issue size experience significantly better liquidity around rating events 
both in terms of price impact and bid-ask spreads and downgrades of financial and 
utility firms are associated with higher abnormal illiquidity. 
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              Figure6: 
         The impact of credit rating downgrades (Panel A) and upgrades (Panel B) within 
investment grade category/ within Non-investment grade category and across the 
investment grade boundary, on corporate bond market illiquidity during -20 Days 
         to 20 Days from rating change. 
 
                                                                         Panel A: Downgrade 
 
Panel B: Upgrade 
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        Figure 7: The impact of credit rating change announcements on corporate bond market 
illiquidity (Amihud) during -20 Days to 20 Days from rating change in normal versus crisis 
period. The crisis      period starts from Dec.2007 and ends in June 2009. 
 
Panel A: Normal period 
 
Panel B: Recession period 
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Figure 8: Trading activity around credit rating downgrade/ upgrade events 
 85 
 
             
     
            Table 8: Distribution of rating changes by rating agency and rating change characteristics. 
This table presents the bond level rating change distributions. Our event study sample consists of 
3,581 downgrades and 1,556 upgrades by Moody’s, S&P and Fitch during the period from July 
2002 to September 2014. Panel A reports the rating change distribution by calendar year. Panel B 
reports the distribution by size of the rating change. Panel C reports the sample distribution by pre-
downgrade (pre-upgrade) letter rating class. Panel D reports the number of downgrades (upgrades) 
that moved the bond out of (in to) the investment grade category. 
 Downgrades  Upgrades 
All Moody’s S&P Fitch All Moody’s S&P Fitch 
Panel A: Sample distribution by calendar year 
2002 450 156 198 96  46 31 11 4 
2003 507 192 177 138  169 80 51 38 
2004 215 83 72 60  164 70 49 45 
2005 239 91 79 69  191 53 86 52 
2006 226 103 72 51  227 68 110 49 
2007 172 95 40 37  266 104 116 46 
2008 599 245 184 170  73 17 32 24 
2009 585 292 184 109  61 18 30 13 
2010 139 51 59 29  94 32 27 35 
2011 218 54 112 52  102 27 43 32 
2012 206 131 30 45  106 46 36 24 
2013 25 5 11 9  57 20 18 19 
Total 3581 1498 1218 865  1556 566 609 381 
Panel B: Sample distribution by size of the rating change 
1 grade 2576 1029 946 601  1279 457 533 289 
2 grades 698 361 178 159  182 86 53 43 
3 grades 161 52 48 61  37 6 11 20 
4 grades 60 21 19 20  20 9 1 10 
5 grades 40 23 13 4  20 5 4 11 
6+ grades 46 12 14 20  18 3 7 8 
Panel C: Sample distribution by pre-downgrade or pre-upgrade letter rating class 
Aaa, AAA 60 24 25 11  0 0 0 0 
Aa, AA 803 369 217 217  120 71 40 9 
A 1375 558 472 345  620 207 297 116 
Baa, BBB 765 294 290 181  364 104 125 135 
Ba, BB 350 141 134 75  247 88 79 80 
B 197 94 73 30  156 67 61 28 
Caa, CCC 31 18 7 6  49 29 7 13 
Panel D: Number of rating changes that cross the investment grade boundary 
Across inv. 
grade 
305 113 115 77  123 43 46 34 
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                    Table 9: Distribution of round-trip trades by trade size 
This table presents the number and percentage of round-trip trades (IRTs) within each 
transaction size class. Panel B shows the distribution of trade types and their average 
round trip cost (RTC) across trading size groups. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Number and percentage distribution of IRTs and IRT transactions across trade sizes 
Trade size  Total Column%  # IRT trades   Row%  #IRTs Column%  
Retail 6,276,041 78.6  4,651,902 74.1  1,537,004 81.0 
Institutional 1,712,795 21.4  866,271 50.6  360,731 19.0 
5k 1,042,181 13.1  751,601 72.1  256,848 13.5 
5k-10k 1,333,425 16.7  1,059,435 79.4  307,280 16.2 
10k-50k 3,202,045 40.1  2,390,610 74.7  801,410 42.2 
50k-100k 698,390 8.7  450,256 64.5  171,466 9.0 
100k-500k 856,618 10.7  447,593 52.2  190,098 10.0 
500k-1MM 281,761 3.5  150,160 53.3  59,646 3.1 
1MM+ 574,416 7.2  268,518 46.7  110,987 5.8 
Total 7,988,836 100.0  5,518,173 69.1  1,897,735 100.0 
Panel B: Percentage of IRT types and mean RTC for each type 
Trade size 
            B/S                 B/D  D/S 
   %     RTC    % RTC    %      RTC 
all 14.61 1.20  24.69 0.52  41.19 0.67 
5k 10.69 1.87  29.14 0.62  38.92 0.68 
5k-10k 14.78 2.02  25.88 0.62  42.90 0.73 
10k-50k 12.19 1.57  25.23 0.56  46.88 0.74 
50k-100k 12.33 0.76  24.97 0.45  44.25 0.63 
100k-500k 15.07 0.31  22.56 0.31  34.25 0.43 
500k-1MM 25.73 0.25  17.50 0.20  23.20 0.25 
1MM+ 37.47 0.21  14.27 0.13  17.50 0.16 
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Table10: The impact of rating downgrades announcements on bond liquidity. 
This table reports the impact of rating downgrades on Amihud and RTC illiquidity measures. The rating changes are 
clustered at the firm level. The event study sample includes 3,581 downgrades by Moody’s, S&P and Fitch during 
the period from July 2002 to September 2014. Panel A shows the liquidity impact of downgrades using the entire 
sample. Panel B shows the impact of downgrades within the investment grade category, Panel C shows the impact 
of downgrades within the non-investment grade category and Panel D shows the impact of downgrades that move 
the firm out of the investment grade category.  
* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates 
significance at the 1% level. t denotes t-test and s denotes signed-rank test. 
        
 
 
Event Window (days) 
CAIL (Amihud) CAIL(RTC) 
N Mean Median  N Mean Median 
[-20,-11] 526 0.89
t(***),s(*) -0.11  428 1.53
 t, s(***)     1.11
 (***) 
[-10,-1] 916 1.93
 t, s(***) 0.37 
(***)  754 3.52
 t, s(***)     2.41
 (***) 
[0,+1] 946 1.62
 t, s(***) -0.00  768 3.40
 t, s(***)     1.53
(***) 
[0,+10] 561 3.29
 t, s(***) 0.88 
(**)  452 4.17
 t, s(***)     3.12
(***) 
[+11,+20] 865 4.25
 t, s(***) 1.81 
(***)  717 6.76
 t, s(***)     4.61
(***) 
Panel B: Downgrades within IG category 
[-20,-11] 368 0.67
 t(***) -0.19  308 1.12
 t, s(***)     0.85
(***) 
[-10,-1] 667 0.92
 t, s(***) 0.14  555 1.69
 t, s(***)    1.17
 (***) 
[0,+1] 689 0.20
t(***) -0.11
(***)  568 0.46
 t, s(***)    0.30
 (***) 
[0,+10] 413 0.99
 t(***), s(*) -0.06  345 1.32
 t, s(***)    0.89
 (***) 
[+11,+20] 629 1.14
 t, s(***) 0.25  532 1.72
 t, s(***)    1.13
 (***) 
Panel C: Downgrades within HY category 
[-20,-11]                102 0.55     -0.11         69
 
   0.91
t(*)     0.61 
[-10,-1]                157 0.76
 t(*)     -0.18        120    0.80
 t(*)     0.37 
[0,+1]         152 -0.14     -0.26
 (***)        118    0.13    -0.00 
[0,+10]        92 0.84
 t(*)     -0.05         67    0.43                   0.73 
[+11,+20]        152 0.18     -0.36        117              -0.28                  -0.09 
Panel D: Downgrades across the IG/HY border 
[-20,-11]                  57 1.69
 t, s(***)      0.97        51   2.95
 t, s(***)   1.85
(***) 
[-10,-1]                  94 1.75
 t, s(***)      0.99
(***)        80   3.39
 t, s(***)   3.56
(***) 
[0,+1]                108 0.58
 t(***), s(*)      0.10        83   1.19
 t, s(***)   1.06
(***) 
[0,+10]                  57 3.65
 t, s(***)     1.89
(**)        41   4.47
 t, s(***)   2.55
(***) 
[+11,+20]                  84 1.72
 t, s(***)     1.19
(***)        68   2.74
 t, s(***)   2.56
(***) 
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  Table11: The impact of rating upgrades announcements on bond liquidity. 
This table reports the impact of rating upgrades on Amihud and RTC illiquidity measures. The rating changes are 
clustered at the firm level. The event study sample includes 1,556 upgrades by Moody’s, S&P and Fitch during the 
period from July 2002 to September 2014. CAIL is the sum of the firm’s daily abnormal bond illiquidity over the 
event window. Daily abnormal bond illiquidity is measured as the bond’s daily illiquidity minus the 
contemporaneous illiquidity on an index of corporate bonds matched by rating and maturity. If a firm has multiple 
bonds affected by the same rating announcement, the firm’s daily abnormal bond illiquidity is the average of 
abnormal illiquidity on its individual bond issues. Panel A shows the liquidity impact of upgrades using the entire 
sample. Panel B shows the impact of upgrades within the investment grade category, Panel C shows the impact of 
upgrades within the non-investment grade category and Panel D shows the impact of upgrades that move the firm 
in to the investment grade category.  
Event Window 
(days) 
CAIL (Amihud) CAIL(RTC) 
N Mean   Median  N Mean   Median 
Panel A: Upgrades in whole sample 
[-20,-11] 232 -0.22
s(**)  -0.43  227        0.38      0.00 
[-10,-1] 355 -0.31
s(***)  -0.49
(***)  349       -0.14      -0.38
(***) 
[0,+1] 361 -0.15
 s(**)  -0.32
(***)  358       -0.39      0.00 
[0,+10] 233 -1.01
 t(**),s(***)  -1
(**)  232       -0.03      -0.36 
[+11,+20] 341 -0.79
 t(*),s(***)  -0.94
(***)  337      -0.90
 t(*),s(**)      -0.63
(***) 
Panel B: Upgrades within IG category 
[-20,-11] 163 -0.23
 s(*) -0.38
(***)  163      -0.27     -0.03 
[-10,-1] 244 -0.15
 s(***) -0.47
(***)  244      -0.05     -0.16
(*) 
[0,+1] 237 -0.08
 s(***) -0.28
(***)  237      -0.07
 s(**)      0.00
(*) 
[0,+10] 158 -0.64
 t ,s(***) -0.66
(***)  158      -0.43
 t(*),s(**)     -0.59
(***) 
[+11,+20] 230 -0.09
 s(**) -0.47
(***)  230      -0.27
 s(*)     -0.30
(***) 
Panel C: Upgrades within HY category 
[-20,-11]            55 -0.15
 s(*) -0.46             52      1.92
 t ,s(***)     1.49 
[-10,-1]            75 -0.41
 s(*) -0.33             72     -0.03                      0.00 
[0,+1]            82 -0.02    -0.19
(*)             79      0.01     0.00 
[0,+10]            59 -0.27    -0.51
(*)             58      0.28    -0.57 
[+11,+20]           72 -0.82
 t,s(**)      -0.89
(**)             71     -0.66    -0.35 
Panel D: Upgrades across the IG/HY border 
[-20,-11]            14 -0.24         0.14             12     -0.97    -0.84 
[-10,-1]            36 -0.37        -0.33             33      0.39     0.38 
[0,+1]            43 -0.47
 t(*),s(**)        -0.43
(**)             43     -0.23                           0.00 
[0,+10]            16 -1.84
 t(*),s(*)        -0.67             16           0.44    -0.11 
[+11,+20]            40 -0.38        -0.71             37      0.21     0.00 
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                Table 12: The impact of credit rating changes on bond liquidity: Normal vs. Recession period. 
This table reports the impact of rating changes on Amihud and RTC illiquidity measures during the 
period before and after the recent financial crisis which is named as normal period (Panel A and Panel 
C) versus the recession period (Panel B and Panel D). The great recession starts from Dec 2007 and 
ends in June 2009. The rating changes are clustered at the firm level. CAIL is the sum of the firm’s 
daily abnormal bond illiquidity over the event window. Daily abnormal bond illiquidity is measured as 
the bond’s daily illiquidity minus the contemporaneous illiquidity on an index of corporate bonds 
matched by rating and maturity.  
Event Window 
(days) 
CAIL (Amihud) CAIL(RTC) 
N       Mean   Median  N Mean   Median 
Downgrades 
Panel A: Downgrades during normal period 
[-20,-11] 347    0.53
 t(***)    -0.11  272 1.65
 t,s(***)    0.97
(***) 
[-10,-1] 641    0.63
 t,s(***)       0.04  505 2.13
 t,s(***)    1.39
(***) 
[0,+1] 668    0.07
 s(*)      -0.12
(***)  521 0.61
 t,s(***)    0.42
(***) 
[0,+10] 393    0.8
 t(***),s(**)      -0.06  298 1.88
 t,s(***)   1.54
(***) 
[+11,+20] 605    0.65
 t,s(***)      -0.02  486 1.84
 t,s(***)   1.22
(***) 
Panel B: Downgrades during the recession period 
[-20,-11]                179    1.19
 t(***)     0.07  156 0.73
 t,s(**)   0.45 
[-10,-1] 275    1.76
 t,s(***)       0.82
(**)  249 0.93
 t,s(***)   0.72
(*) 
[0,+1] 278    0.47
 t(***)    -0.01  247 
0.24
 
t(**),s(*)   
0.23
(*) 
[0,+10] 168    2.20
 t,s(***)       0.72  154 0.67
 t(*)   0.39 
[+11,+20] 260    1.91
 t,s(***)     1.11
(***)  231 0.77
 t,s(***)   0.34 
Upgrades 
Panel C: Upgrades during normal period 
[-20,-11]              212    -0.23
 s(**)   -0.39
(***)      207 0.26 -0.01 
[-10,-1]              320    -0.38
 t,s(***)    -0.48
(***)      314       -0.04 -0.14 
[0,+1]              341    -0.12 
s(***)    -0.29
(***)      338 -0.06
 s(*)   0.00
(**) 
[0,+10]             217    -0.63
 t,s(***)    -0.58
(***)      216 -0.13
 s(*)   -0.56
(**) 
[+11,+20]             303    -0.4
 t,s(***)    -0.62
(***)      229 -0.30                 -0.29
(***) 
Panel D: Upgrades during recession period 
[-20,-11]                  20    -0.09  -0.13      20 -0.54 -0.03 
[-10,-1]                  35     1.12
 t(*)    -0.08      35  0.34 0.02 
[0,+1]                  20    -0.01  -0.08      20 -0.13 -0.24 
[0,+10]                  16      -0.61  -0.72      16 -1.11 -0.90 
[+11,+20]                  38     0.70   0.61      38 -0.28 -0.32 
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      Table13: Determinants of corporate bond market illiquidity around downgrade events. 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions for testing the effect of various bond level, firm level and 
market related factors on corporate bonds abnormal illiquidity around downgrade events. The dependent 
variable is CAIL over the [0, +10] days window around downgrade event. CAIL is the sum of the firm’s daily 
abnormal bond illiquidity over the event window. Crisis is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the 
downgrade happens during the period from Dec. 2007 to June 2009 and zero otherwise. CAIL (-20,-10)>0is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the firm’s cumulative abnormal illiquidity over day -20 to -10 is greater than 
zero, and zero otherwise. # of grades is the absolute value of the number of grades that the rating is decreased 
by the downgrade. Cross Inv/Spec border is a dummy variable equal to one if the downgrade moved the firm 
out of the investment grade category. Moody's (S&P) is a dummy variable equal to one if the downgrade is a 
Moody’s (S&P) downgrade and zero otherwise. Old rating: Baa / Old rating: HY are dummy variable equal to 
one if the pre-downgrade letter rating class is Baa/in high yield category. # of bonds is the number of bonds of 
the firm that are affected by the downgrade. #customer sell (#customer buy) is the average number of daily 
customer sells (buys) across all the bonds of the firm that are affected by the downgrade over the [0,+10] days 
window around rating event.  
* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates 
significance at the 1% level 
      
 
 
CAIL (Amihud) 
 
                CAIL (RTC) 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Crisis 1.277** 1.623*** 2.059*** -1.103** -0.711 0.360 
   
3.301*** 
  
 4.106*** 
Rating variables 
# of grades 
       
0.859*** 0.831*** 1.315***  0.409* 0.405* 0.012 
Cross Inv/Spec border 1.690* 1.224 -0.932  1.832* 1.706* 0.176 
Moody's  0.053 -0.144 -0.750  -0.340 -0.516 -2.029*** 
S&P 0.575 0.623 -0.633  0.536 0.763 -0.746 
Old rating: Baa -0.413 -0.808 -0.043  0.081 -0.454 1.572* 
Old rating: HY -0.969 -1.549** -1.823*  -1.775** -1.574** -1.262 
 # of bonds 0.424*** 0.320** 0.254  0.273* 0.069 -0.106 
Trading activity variables 
#customer sell 
       
 0.510*** 0.572***   0.197** 0.107 
#customer buy  -0.023 -0.07   0.167*** 0.121*** 
volume  -0.057 -0.055   -
0.114*** 
-0.101* 
Issue/ Issuer characteristics 
Issue size 
       
-1.831*** -2.113*** -1.943**  -1.301** -1.159** -1.52* 
Coupon 0.337 0.299 0.467  0.449* 0.379* 0.111 
Maturity 0.001 0.003 -0.056  0.034 0.050 0.061 
Age 0.124* 0.119* 0.077  -0.053 -0.074 -0.74 
Utility -0.787 -0.200 1.273  2.941*** 4.233*** 4.720** 
Finance 1.401** 1.298** 0.556  0.877 0.756 0.911 
Intercept -4.370*** -4.301*** -5.832***  -2.014 -2.091 -1.205 
Obs 561 561 276  452 452 206 
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.16 0.29  0.08 0.17 0.33 
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      Table 14: Determinants of corporate bond market illiquidity around upgrade events. 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions for testing the effect of various bond level, firm level and 
market related factors on corporate bonds abnormal illiquidity around upgrade events. The dependent variable is 
CAIL over the [0, +10] days window around upgrade event. CAIL is the sum of the firm’s daily abnormal bond 
illiquidity over the event window. Crisis is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the upgrade happens 
during the period from Dec. 2007 to June 2009 and zero otherwise. CAIL (-20,-10)<0is a dummy variable equal 
to one if the firm’s cumulative abnormal illiquidity over day -20 to -10 is greater than zero, and zero otherwise. 
# of grades is the absolute value of the number of grades that the rating is increased by the upgrade. Cross 
Inv/Spec border is a dummy variable equal to one if the upgrade moved the firm out of the investment grade 
category. Moody's (S&P) is a dummy variable equal to one if the upgrade is a Moody’s (S&P) upgrade and zero 
otherwise. Old rating: Baa / Old rating: HY are dummy variable equal to one if the pre-upgrade letter rating 
class is Baa/in high yield category. # of bonds is the number of bonds of the firm that are affected by the 
upgrade. #customer sell (#customer buy) is the average number of daily customer sells (buys) across all the 
bonds of the firm that are affected by the upgrade over the [0,+10] days window around rating event.   
 
CAIL (Amihud) 
 
                CAIL (RTC) 
     (1)         (2)     (3)            (1)           (2)                (3) 
Crisis   0.667      0.657  0.156         -1.152    -1.284   -1.183 
   
-1.146* 
  
   -1.681** 
Rating variables 
# of grades 
       
-0.127    -0.116 0.596*      0.344* 0.245    0.861** 
Cross Inv/Spec border -1.498*    -1.345* -0.903      0.321 0.722    2.007 
Moody's    0.080     0.143 -0.412      0.698 0.683    1.408* 
S&P -0.934**    -0.969** -0.893     -0.684 -0.846   -0.174 
Old rating: Baa/BBB -0.889*    -0.658 -0.255      0.052 0.261    0.511 
Old rating: HY -0.779    -0.688 -0.517     -0.962 -1.565**   -2.546** 
 % of bonds   0.246     0.148 -0.131     0.428** 0.267    0.418 
Trading activity variables 
#customer sell 
       
    0.289 0.406    0.671***   0.639** 
#customer buy    -0.061 -0.475**   0.227 -0.016 
volume    -0.194*** -0.081   -0.166** -0.089 
Issue/ Issuer characteristics 
Issue size 
       
-1.715***  -0.970 0.100    -1.293* -1.604** -1.858 
Coupon  0.098    0.073 -0.211     0.415* 0.387*   0.103 
Maturity -0.008    0.006 0.013     0.040 0.06**   0.162*** 
Age  0.135**    0.094* 0.177**     0.063 0.017   0.026 
Utility  1.860*    1.662* 0.501    -0.551 -0.856 -5.522** 
Finance  0.606    0.662 0.159    -0.070 -0.423 -2.535** 
Intercept -1.422   -1.088 0.325    -
3.935*** 
-3.402** -0.752 
Obs    233    2.33  102       232 232   100 
Adjusted R2   0.165    0.198 0.189     0.121 0.168 0.318 
* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates significance 
at the 1% level. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
 This paper reviews the large and growing literature on the impact of liquidity on 
corporate bond pricing and yield spreads.  Our discussion covers both theoretical and 
empirical papers in this field. We start by a brief review of the concept and models of 
liquidity and follow by a review on the impact of liquidity on asset prices. Next, we 
focus on corporate bond market and review theoretical as well as empirical researches 
contributing to the field.  
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1. Introduction 
There is a huge theoretical and empirical literature that explores the impact of 
corporate bonds’ Credit risk on its’ yield spread, the spread between the yield of a 
corporate bond and the yield of the risk free bond with comparable characteristics, 
which has its’ origin in the structural credit risk models pioneered by the work of 
Black and Scholes (1963) and Merton (1974). However as empirically demonstrated 
by Jones, Mason, and Rosenfeld (1984), Black Scholes Merton model generates credit 
spreads that are smaller than actually observed. As such, many academics have tried to 
expand the original model by incorporating more realistic features of corporate debt. 
Some important works in this area include Black and Cox (1976), Geske (1977), 
Geske and Johnson (1984), Longstaff and Schwarts (1995), Leland (1994), Leland and 
Toft (1996) and Collin- Dufrense and Goldstein (2001) among others.  
Also, a growing body of literature has focused on the “non-default component” of 
yield spreads for explaining the “credit spread puzzle” that arises from Merton (1974) 
model. Their findings suggest that the “non-default component” is strongly associated 
with liquidity measures. Usually in these studies credit spread is treated as a 
combination of two parts: “default premium” and “liquidity premium” and the impact 
of each component on the cross sectional and time series variations of credit spread is 
empirically measured (e.g. Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis, 2005; Friewald, Jankowitsch 
and Subrahmanyam, 2009; by Bao, Pan and Wang, 2011; Dick-Nielsen, Feldhutter 
and Lando, 2012).  
This paper reviews the literature related to the key theoretical and empirical 
researches that model and quantify the liquidity component of yield spreads including 
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some recent studies that focus on the role of illiquidity during the recent financial 
crisis.  
First, we start by a brief background of the concept and theoretical models of 
liquidity in section 2. Section 3 gives an overview of the studies on the impact of 
liquidity on asset prices. In section 4, we turn our focus to corporate bond market and 
review structural credit risk models including the recent ones including liquidity either 
as an exogenous shock or an endogenous risk factor. Section 5 reviews the empirical 
studies on bond pricing and liquidity.  
2. Models of liquidity 
Liquidity is one of the key concepts in securities markets which is often a 
desirable feature and reflects a well-functioning market. At the same time it is not 
directly observable from the market data and is not easily measurable.  Based on the 
intuitive but wage definition of Keynes, an asset is liquid if "it is more certainly 
realizable at short notice without loss." 
Market liquidity hinges in large part on whether market-makers respond to 
temporary imbalances in supply and demand by stepping in as buyers (or sellers) 
against trades sought by other market participants. The role of market makers as 
liquidity providers and price setting agents was originally studied in the traditional 
inventory based models of market microstructure. Researchers have typically followed 
three broad approaches to model liquidity and how prices are set by market makers. 
One approach is inventory based modeling. The inventory based models view the 
trading process as a matching problem in which the market maker or price setting 
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agent must use prices to balance supply and demand across time. There are several 
distinct modeling approaches in this area. For example Garman (1976) focus on the 
nature of order flow. Stoll (1978) examine the optimization problem facing dealers 
and Cohen, Maier, Schwartz and Whitcomb (1981) analyze the effect of multiple 
providers for immediacy. Common to all these models are uncertainties in order flow, 
which can result in inventory problems for market maker and execution problem for 
dealers.  
Amihud and Mendelson (1980), Ho and Stoll (1981, 1983), Mildenstein and Schleef 
(1983), and Grossman and Miller (1988) examined the impact of inventories on 
liquidity provision. Based on Grossman and Miller (1988), market liquidity is 
determined by the demand and supply of immediacy. In their setting, exogenous 
liquidity events and the risk of delayed trade create a demand for immediacy. Market 
makers supply immediacy by their presence and willingness to take inventory risk 
during the period between the arrival of final buyers and sellers. The number of 
market makers is adjusted in the long run to determine the equilibrium level of 
liquidity in the market. They show that the lower is the autocorrelation in rates of 
return, the higher is the equilibrium level of liquidity.  
In general, inventory models without capital constraints predict that liquidity (the 
width of the bid-ask spread) is not affected by the market maker’s inventory position, 
but there are exceptions (e.g. Amihud and Mendelson 1980; Shen and Starr (2002). 
O’Hara and Oldfield (1986) show that spreads depend on inventories if market makers 
are risk-averse. Even models that do not predict a link between inventories and the 
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width of the spread can generate time variation in liquidity, as a market maker’s desire 
to supply liquidity is typically a function of an asset’s fundamental volatility. 
A second approach is related to the effect of asymmetric information on market 
prices. If some traders are better informed about the underlying value of an asset,  their 
trades could reveal the information  and affects the behavior of prices. This approach 
is followed by Kyle (1984, 1985), Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Easley and 
O’Hara (1987) among others. 
The third and more recent approach focuses on funding costs and financing 
constraints of market makers. In a model with margin constraints, Gromb and 
Vayanos (2002) show how arbitrageurs’ liquidity provision benefits all investors. 
Coughenour and Deli (2002) examine the influence of the organizational form of  the 
NYSE specialist firms on the nature of liquidity provision. They compare closely held 
firms whose specialists provide liquidity with their own capital to widely held firms 
whose specialists provide liquidity with diffusely owned capital. They argue that 
specialists using their own capital have a greater incentive and ability to reduce 
adverse selection costs, but face a greater cost of capital.  
Weill (2007) examines dynamic liquidity provision by market makers and shows 
that competitive market makers offer the socially optimal amount of liquidity, if they 
have access to sufficient capital. In his model, at time zero, outside investors receive 
an aggregate shock which lowers their marginal utility for holding assets relative to 
cash. This creates a sudden need for cash and induces a large selling pressure. Then, 
randomly over time, each investor recovers from the shock, implying that the initial 
selling pressure slowly disappears. The asset market can be illiquid in his model in the 
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sense that investors make contact with market makers only after random delays. In this 
economic environment, market makers offer buyers and sellers “immediacy”. Market 
makers anticipate that after the selling pressure subsides, they will achieve contact 
with more buyers than sellers, which will allow them then to transfer assets to buyers 
in two ways. Therefore, by accumulating inventories early, when the selling pressure 
is large, market makers mitigate the adverse impact on investors of execution delays. 
The socially optimal asset allocation maximizes the sum of investors’ and market 
makers’ intertemporal utility, subject to the order-execution technology. He shows that 
if marketmakers maintain sufficient capital, the socially optimal allocation is 
implemented in a competitive equilibrium. However, If marketmakers do not maintain 
sufficient capital, then they are not able to purchase as many assets as prescribed by 
the socially optimal allocation. 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) construct a model along the lines of Grossman 
and Miller (1988) that also links an asset’s market liquidity and traders’ funding 
liquidity. The ability of market makers to provide liquidity depends on their access to 
funding. Conversely, dealers’ funding and their capital and margin requirements, 
depends on the assets’ market liquidity. They show that, under certain conditions, 
margins are destabilizing and market liquidity and funding liquidity are mutually 
reinforcing, leading to liquidity spirals. Furthermore they show that limited risk-
bearing capacity can have a differential impact on high and low fundamental volatility 
stocks. They use the term “flight to quality” to refer to the result that the liquidity 
differential between high and low volatility securities is greater when market makers 
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have taken on larger positions or when market-maker wealth decreases. Flight-to-
quality evidence is also present in Pastor and Stambaugh (2003).  
3. Liquidity and asset prices 
Based on the discussion provided in the previous section, dealers’ bid-ask spread 
(quoted or effective) which is defined as the difference in price between the highest 
price that a buyer is willing to pay and the lowest price for which a seller is willing to 
sell an asset, is commonly used as a measure of liquidity. Illiquidity can be measured 
by the cost of immediate execution. An investor willing to transact faces a tradeoff. He 
may either wait to transact at a favorable price or insist on immediate execution at the 
current bid or ask price. The quoted ask (offer) price includes a premium for 
immediate buying and the bid price similarly reflects a concession required for 
immediate sale. Thus the spread between the bid and ask prices can be a natural 
measure of illiquidity.  
Roll (1984) gives a measure of effective bid-ask spread assuming an efficient 
market ( ) in which  is the first order serial covariance of 
successive price changes. This equation implies that the spread can be inferred from 
the sequence of price changes by computing and transforming serial covariance. Since 
collecting the bid-ask spreads from the market data is a costly procedure he validates 
this result indirectly by relating the measured implicit spread to firm size. Firm size is 
positively related to volume and volume is negatively related to spread. So there 
should be a strong negative cross sectional relation between measured spread and 
measured size which is confirmed by empirical results. Another interesting point in 
this paper is that using daily data, the average value of the implicit bid-ask spread 
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across all stocks and time periods was only 0.298 percent. But the average implicit 
bid-ask spread estimated from weekly returns was 1.74 percent which is proved to be 
significantly different from 0.298. Since the spread inferred from any observation 
intervals must be equal when the market is informationally efficient, these results cast 
doubt on the efficiency of the New York and American Exchanges which are 
considered in this research. 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) studied the effect of the bid-ask spread on asset 
pricing. They showed that market observed expected return is an increasing and 
concave function of the spread. Their model predicts that higher spread assets yield 
higher expected returns and that there is a clientele effect whereby investors with 
longer holding periods select assets with higher spreads. The prediction offered by 
their model can be tested by estimating the following regression for a portfolio j of 
assets: 
 
Where  denotes the average monthly rate of return on a stock included in 
the portfolio j in excess of the 90-day return on Treasury bonds, is the beta 
coefficient for portfolio j, and  is the average bid-ask spread. The empirical 
analysis based on estimates for (1) shows a high level of significance for all the 
arguments of the regression. Their research highlights the importance of securities 
market microstructure in determining asset returns and provides a link between this 
area and mainstream research on capital markets. 
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Also Amihud and Mendelson (1988, 1991) show that average portfolio returns 
increase with the spread, and the spread effect persists if firm size is included in 
equation (1) as an additional variable. 
In Amihud (2002), time-series effect of liquidity on stock returns is considered as 
well as the cross sectional effect which had been previously explored by other 
researchers. This study suggested that over time, the ex-ante stock excess return is 
increasing in the expected illiquidity of the stock market, suggesting that expected 
stock excess return which is traditionally called risk premium and has been considered 
a compensation for risk, partly represents an illiquidity premium (a compensation for 
expected market illiquidity). He proposed the ILLIQ measure of illiquidity which is 
the daily ratio of absolute stock return to its dollar volume, averaged over some period 
(a rough measure of price impact). It can be interpreted as the daily price response 
associated with one dollar of trading volume. According to the results both across 
stocks and over time, expected stock returns are an increasing function of expected 
illiquidity. Across NYSE stock during 1964-1997, ILLIQ has a positive and highly 
significant effect on expected return. Results also show that unexpected market 
illiquidity lowers contemporaneous stock prices. This illiquidity effects are shown to 
be stronger for small firms stocks. This suggests that variations over time in size 
effect, are related to changes in market liquidity over time. The negative effect of 
unexpected illiquidity is observed because higher realized illiquidity raises expected 
illiquidity which in turn leads to higher stock expected returns. Then stock prices 
should decline to make the expected return rise (assuming that corporate cash flows 
are unaffected by market liquidity). 
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In another study Huang (2002) shows that illiquidity can have large effects on 
asset returns when agents face liquidity shocks and borrowing constraints. 
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) also investigated whether market wide liquidity is a 
state variable important for asset pricing. In order to construct their individual measure 
of illiquidity they focused on a dimension of liquidity associated with temporary price 
changes accompanying order flow. They obtained the measure of market liquidity in a 
given month as the equally weighted average of the liquidity measures of individual 
stocks in NYSE and AMEX, using daily data within the month. 
The aggregate measure was then regressed on its lag as well as the lag of the 
scaled level series and the fitted residual of this regression is taken as the innovation in 
liquidity. They defined liquidity beta as the coefficient on liquidity innovation in a 
regression that also includes the three factors of Fama and French. The results suggest 
the following points: expected stock returns are related cross sectionally to the 
sensitivities of returns to fluctuations in aggregate liquidity. Stocks that are more 
sensitive to aggregate liquidity have substantially higher expected returns even after 
accounting for exposures to the market return, size, value and momentum factors and 
liquidity risk factor accounts for half of the profits to a momentum strategy over the 
period of 1966 to 1999. 
Acharya and Pedersen (2005) proposed a liquidity adjusted capital asset pricing 
model. Their model provides a unified theoretical framework that helps understand the 
various channels through which liquidity risk may affect asset pricing and can explain 
the previous empirical findings that : 
 Return sensitivity to market liquidity is priced.(Pastor and Stambaugh,2003) 
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 Average liquidity is priced.(Amihud and Mendelson,1986) 
 Liquidity co-moves with return and predict future returns (Amihud, 2002; Chordia 
et al, 2001a; Jones, 2001; Bekaert et.al.2003). 
In their asset pricing model, three liquidity betas are included based on three 
liquidity risk components: commonality in liquidity with market liquidity, return 
sensitivity to market liquidity and liquidity sensitivity to market returns. They use 
Amihud ILLIQ measure as liquidity proxy in their study. Their results show that 
liquidity adjusted CAPM explains the data better than the standard CAPM, while still 
exploiting the same degree of freedom. Positive shocks to illiquidity, if persistent, are 
associated with a low contemporaneous returns and high predicted future returns. 
They also found a weak evidence that liquidity risk is important over and above the 
market risk and the level of liquidity. According to their findings, liquidity risk 
explains about 1.1 percent of cross sectional returns and about 80 percent of this effect 
is due to the liquidity sensitivity to the market return. 
Lou and Sadka (2010) show that the performance of stocks during the financial 
crisis can be better explained by their historical liquidity betas as measured by the 
covariation of their return with unexpected changes in aggregate liquidity. Their 
findings show that although considered safe assets in general, liquid stocks 
underperformed illiquid stocks during the financial crisis of 2008-2009. These 
findings highlight the importance of accounting for both liquidity level and liquidity 
risk in risk management applications. 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) provided a model that relates market liquidity 
and funding liquidity. While market liquidity of an asset is the ease with which it is 
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traded, traders funding liquidity is the ease with which they can obtain funding. 
Traders provide market liquidity and their ability to do so depends on their availability 
of funding. Conversely traders funding (their capital and margin requirements), 
depends on the asset market liquidity. Their proposed model explains the empirically 
documented features that market liquidity can suddenly dry up, has commonality 
across securities, is related to volatility, is subject to flight to quality and co-moves 
with the market. 
4. Structural credit risk models and credit spread puzzle 
In Section 3, we discussed papers studying the impact of liquidity on securities 
prices. While the studies reviewed in previous section were mostly related to stock 
market, we now turn our focus to corporate bonds. The literature on corporate bond 
pricing and bonds’ yield spread which is commonly referred to as ‘credit spread’ has 
its root in the pioneering work of Merton (1974) which utilized the Black and Scholes 
(1963) option pricing model to derive the value of firms’ equity and debt. However it 
is widely recognized that the observed difference between the yield of a corporate 
bond and the yield of a risk free government bond with comparable maturities is wider 
than what is predicted by the structural credit risk model of Merton (1974) particularly 
for investment grade bonds. This difference between the actual credit spreads and the 
spreads predicted by the structural models gives rise to the ‘credit spread puzzle’ 
which has stimulated the academics to study the non-default component of credit 
spreads (eg. Longstaff and Schwartz, 1995a; Duffie and Singleton,1997; Goldstein, 
and Martin, 2001; Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Helwege, 2003 among many 
others).  
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Recently, few studies have developed structural credit risk models incorporating 
secondary market illiquidity. The first paper along this line is He and Xiong (2012) 
which examines the effect of bond market liquidity deterioration on the firm’s credit 
risk.  Their model builds on the structural credit risk model of Leland (1994) and 
Leland and Toft (1996) which is based on the endogenous default notion of Black and 
Cox (1976). Briefly explained, the endogenous default concept is as follows: When a 
bond matures, the firm issues a new bond with the same face value and maturity to 
replace it at the market price, which can be higher or lower than the principal of the 
maturing bond. This rollover gain/loss is absorbed by the firm’s equity holders. As a 
result, the equity price is determined by the firm’s current fundamental (i.e., the firm’s 
value when it is unlevered) and expected future rollover gains/losses. When the equity 
value drops to zero, the firm defaults endogenously and bond holders can only recover 
their debt by liquidating the firm’s assets at a discount. Based on the above 
explanation, one can imagine a positive feedback loop between price and credit 
quality. 
In He and Xiong (2012), an exogenous liquidity shock triggers the endogenous 
default: Bond holders are subject to Poisson liquidity shocks. Upon the arrival of a 
liquidity shock, a bond holder has to sell his holdings at a proportional cost. The 
trading cost multiplied by bond holders’ liquidity shock intensity determines the 
liquidity premium in the firm’s credit spread. The increased liquidity premium (i.e. 
Decreased secondary market price) feeds back to the primary market and suppresses 
the market price of the firm’s newly issued bonds and increases equity Holders’ 
rollover losses.  
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In another paper, He and Milbradt (2014) expand He and Xiong (2012) 
framework and introduce the concept of endogenous liquidity. Their rationale on how 
a decline in firms’ credit quality affects bond liquidity is based on endogenous bid-ask 
spread notion of Duffie, Gârleanu, and Pedersen (2005). Two types of investors exist 
in their model: high type and low type. High type investors are the ones that incur no 
cost for holding the asset. Low type investors are the ones affected by an exogenous 
liquidity shock and incur holding cost, so they search for a dealer to get rid of the 
bond. Chen, Cui, He and Milbradt (2015) model this holding cost in light of 
collateralized borrowing and assume that the bond is part of a large portfolio including 
leverage and can be used as collateral for these loans. Borrowing against the bond 
involves haircut. The decline in bonds credit quality pushes down its market price and 
increases the haircut. This in turn drives down the low type investor valuation of the 
bond and widens the valuation wedge between high type and low type investors. Since 
the bid-ask spread in their model is a function of investors bargaining power and the 
valuation wedge between low type and high type investors, the above procedure 
results in a rise in the bid-ask spreads. They further propose a structural decomposition 
that nests the common additive default-liquidity decomposition to quantify the 
interaction between default and liquidity for corporate bonds. Similar to Longstaff et 
al. (2005), using CDS spread to proxy for default risk, they identify the “default” part 
by pricing a bond in a counterfactually perfectly liquid market but with the model 
implied default threshold. They identify the remaining credit spread after subtracting 
this “default” part as the “liquidity” part. Then they further decompose the “default” 
(“liquidity”) part into a “pure default” (“pure liquidity”) component and a “liquidity-
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driven-default” (“default-driven liquidity”) component, where the “pure default” or 
“pure liquidity” part is the spread implied by a counterfactual model where either the 
bond market is perfectly liquid as in Leland and Toft (1996) hence equity holders 
default later, or only the over-the-counter search friction for risk free bonds is at work 
as in Duffie et al. (2005), respectively. The two interaction terms that emerge, i.e., the 
“liquidity-driven default” and the “default-driven liquidity” components, capture the 
endogenous positive spiral between default and liquidity.  
5. Empirical studies on bonds liquidity premium  
A growing stream of empirical research related to both corporate bond pricing 
and liquidity is related to the credit spread puzzle. Credit spread is the component of 
corporate bond yields that is above and beyond the yield of comparable default free 
treasury bonds. In other words excess interest rate that would be earned if the 
corporation does not default and the investor holds the bond to maturity. 
This definition suggests that credit spread is supposed to reflect the financial 
health of the firm that issued the bond.  As discussed in the previous section, in 
practice, empirical researchers have only been able to explain less than half of the 
variation in credit spreads and therein lays the credit spread puzzle. In explaining the 
puzzle researchers have turned their attention to non default rated factors that would 
be common to the credit spreads of most firms in the economy. One of these factors is 
the tax difference between interest earned on corporate and treasury bonds. Another 
factor that may contribute to the yield spread between corporate bonds and Treasury 
securities, is related to notable difference between the liquidity level of corporate 
bonds with that of the Treasury securities with similar maturity. The volume of 
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transaction for corporate bonds is far less than for treasury securities. Moreover the 
information content of bond prices tend to be lower for less actively traded securities. 
For corporate bonds, compensation for liquidity risk shows up in higher interest rate 
spreads over otherwise comparable treasury bonds. The financial crisis of 2008 has 
brought renewed interest and a sense of urgency to this topic as concerns over both 
illiquidity and credit risk intensified at the same time and it was not clear which factor 
was the dominating force in driving up corporate bond spreads. The aggregate 
illiquidity doubled from its pre-crisis average in August 2007 when the credit problem 
first broke out. By September 2008, it was five times it pre crisis average and over 12 
standard deviations away. 
Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005) find that the non-default component is time 
varying and strongly related to measures of both bond-specific liquidity and aggregate 
bond market liquidity. Calculating spreads relative to the Treasury curve, they find 
that the non-default component represents 17 percent for BB-rated bonds, 29 percent 
for BBB-rated bonds, 44 percent for A-rated bonds and 49 percent of the spread for 
AAA/AA rated bonds. After financial crisis of 2007-2009 a number of studies have 
investigated the relative importance of liquidity component vs. default component of 
credit Spreads during the financial crisis.  
In a research conducted by Edwards et al. (2007), a complete record of US over-
the-counter (OTC) secondary trades in corporate bonds is used to estimate average 
transaction costs as a function of trade size. Findings suggest that transaction costs 
decrease significantly with trade size. Highly rated bonds, recently issued bonds and 
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bonds close to maturity have lower transaction costs than do other bonds and costs are 
lower for bonds transparent trade prices. 
Dick-Nielsen, Feldhütter and Lando (2012) analyzed liquidity components of 
corporate bond spreads during 2005-2009 and found that the spread contribution from 
illiquidity increases dramatically with the onset of the subprime crisis. According to 
their results the increase is slow and persistent for investment grade bonds while the 
effect is stronger but more short-lived for speculative grade bonds. 
Similar results for the crisis period are obtained by Bao, Pan and Wang (2011). 
Using transactions data from 2003 to 2009, they examine the illiquidity of corporate 
bonds and its asset pricing implications. They show that in aggregate, changes in 
market level illiquidity explain a substantial part of the time variation in yield spreads 
of high rated (AAA through A) bonds, overshadowing the credit risk component. In 
the cross section, the bond level illiquidity measure explains individual bond yields 
spreads with large economic significance. They also find that bond illiquidity is 
related to several bond characteristics. In particular illiquidity increases with a bonds 
age and maturity but decreases with its issuance size. Price reversals are inversely 
related to trade size (price changes accompanied by small trades, exhibit stronger 
reversals than those accompanied by large trades). According to their results, while 
during normal times aggregate liquidity and aggregate credit risk are equally important 
in explaining yield spreads of high rated bonds, illiquidity becomes much more 
important during the 2008 crisis. Relating this observation to the discussion on 
whether the 2008 crisis was mainly a liquidity or credit crisis, these results suggest 
that as far as high rated corporate bonds are concerned, the sudden increase in 
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illiquidity was the dominating factor in driving up the yield spreads. A measure of 
illiquidity, for each individual bond is constructed in this paper which is the negative 
of auto covariance in relative price changes (γ). The lack of liquidity in an asset gives 
rise to transitory components in its prices and thus the magnitude of such transitory 
price movements reflects the degree of illiquidity in the market. Because transitory 
price movements lead to negatively serially correlated price changes, γ gives a 
meaningful measure of illiquidity. As mentioned before, Roll (1984) first considered 
the simple case in which the transitory price movements arise from bid-ask bounce, 
where . But According to Bao et.al. (2011), in more general cases, 
γ captures the broader impact of illiquidity on prices above and beyond the effect of 
bid- ask spread. 
Feldhütter (2012), uses the difference between prices paid by small traders and 
those paid by large traders as a measure to identify when the market price of an over-
the-counter traded asset is below its fundamental value due to selling pressure. Using a 
structural estimation his model for OTC trading with search frictions and periods with 
selling pressures is able to identify liquidity crisis (i.e. high number of forced sellers in 
the US corporate bond market.) 
Tsuji (2005) empirically tests the explanatory power of the factors implied by the 
theory on credit spreads, and presents the puzzle that such factors explain little of 
these spreads. Economically approaching this puzzle he tests the explanatory power of 
other economic factors such as credit rating, illiquidity, investors' preferences, and the 
business cycle. 
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 Zheng (2006) discusses the interaction of default risk and liquidity risk on 
pricing financial contracts and shows that the two risks are almost indistinguishable if 
the underlying contract has non-negative values. However, if the underlying contract 
can take negative values as well, depending on their loss rates and distributions, these 
two risks demand different risk premiums. A structural default model and a discrete 
time default model with exponentially distributed liquidity shocks are discussed in this 
paper. Based on these models, short-term yield spreads are dominated by liquidity risk 
rather than credit risk. A two-stage procedure is suggested to calibrate the model with 
one scalar optimization problem and one linear programming problem. 
Houweling, Mentink and Vorst (2005) used nine different proxies (issued 
amount, listed, euro, on-the-run, age, missing prices, yield volatility, number of 
contributors and yield dispersion) to measure corporate bond liquidity and used a four-
variable model to control for interest rate risk, credit risk, maturity and rating 
differences between bonds. Based on a sample of euro corporate bonds, the null 
hypothesis that liquidity risk is not priced is rejected for eight of these liquidity 
proxies. Using a comparison test between liquidity proxies they found limited 
differences between the proxies. 
Using a panel data for the period from year 1993 through 2008, Chen, Liao and 
Tsai (2011) showed that corporate internal liquidity risk significantly impacts bond 
yield spreads (and changes) when controlling for well-known bond yield determinant 
variables, traditional accounting measures of corporate debt servicing ability, cash 
flow volatility, credit ratings, and state variables. Their findings shows that internal 
liquidity risk should therefore be incorporated into bond yield spread modeling. 
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Lin, Wang and Wu (2011) studied the pricing of liquidity risk in the cross section 
of corporate bonds for the period from January 1994 to March 2009. Their results 
showed that the average return on bonds with high sensitivities to aggregate liquidity 
exceeds that for bonds with low sensitivities by about 4 percent annually. In their 
study, they control for the effects of default and term betas, liquidity level, and bond 
characteristics. They conclude that liquidity risk is an important determinant of 
expected corporate bond returns.  
Gefang, Koop and Potter (2011) developed a structured dynamic factor model for 
the spreads between London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and overnight index 
swap (OIS) rates for a panel of banks. Their model involves latent factors which 
reflect liquidity and credit risk. Their results show that surges in the short term 
LIBOR-OIS spreads during the 2007-2009 financial crisis were largely driven by 
liquidity risk. However, credit risk played a more significant role in the longer term 
(twelve-month) LIBOR-OIS spread. The liquidity risk factors show more volatility 
than the credit risk factor. They argued that most of the familiar events in the financial 
crisis were linked more to movements in liquidity risk than credit risk. 
Kalimipalli and Nayak (2012) empirically investigated the relative effects of 
equity volatility and bond liquidity in the cross-section of corporate bond spreads and 
showed that while both volatility and liquidity effects are significant, volatility, 
representing ex-ante credit shock, has the first-order impact, and liquidity represented 
by bond characteristics and price impact measure has the secondary impact on bond 
spreads. Conditional analysis further reveals that distressed bonds and distressed 
regimes are both associated with significantly higher impact of volatility and liquidity 
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shocks. They find that the relative impact of these effects depend both on the 
underlying bond characteristics and general market conditions. 
Friewald, Jankowitsch and Subrahmanyam (2012) investigated whether liquidity 
is an important price factor in the US corporate bond market. Particularly they focus 
on liquidity effects in periods of financial crises, especially for bonds with high credit 
risk, using a data set of more than 20,000 bonds, between October 2004 and December 
2008. Using different liquidity measures, they find that liquidity effects account for 
approximately 14 percent of the explained market-wide corporate yield spread 
changes and the economic impact of the liquidity measures is significantly larger in 
periods of crisis, and for speculative grade bonds. 
Acharya, Amihud and Bharath (2013) studied the exposure of the US corporate 
bond returns to liquidity shocks of stocks and Treasury bonds over the period from 
1973 to 2007 in a regime-switching model. Their findings suggest a heterogeneous 
effect of liquidity shocks on investment grade and speculative grade bond prices 
during different regimes. While in one regime, liquidity shocks show insignificant 
effects on bond prices, in another regime, an increase in illiquidity produces 
significant and conflicting effects: Prices of investment-grade bonds rise but prices of 
high yield bonds substantially fall relative to the market. Relating the probability of 
these regimes to macroeconomic conditions they found that the second regime can be 
predicted by economic conditions that are characterized as stress. While they control 
for other systemic risks, they find time-varying liquidity risk of corporate bond returns 
conditional on episodes of flight to liquidity. They also found a similar pattern for 
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stocks classified by high or low book-to-market ratio, where again, liquidity shocks 
play a special role in periods characterized by adverse economic conditions. 
Helwege, Huang and Wang (2013) tried to disentangle the credit risk factor and 
liquidity risk factor empirically. They separated out the credit risk component by 
examining bonds that are issued by the same firm and that trade on the same day, 
allowing us to examine the effects of liquidity in a sample of bond pairs. Testing 
standard liquidity measures to determine how well they explain the differences in the 
two bonds yield spreads, their findings suggest that the proxies do a poor job of 
measuring liquidity effects. Although incorporating liquidity proxies related to other 
bonds issued by the firm and those for bonds of other firms significantly improved the 
explanatory power, they still found a significant portion of the spread unexplained and 
largely driven by a common unknown factor. They conclude that good proxies for the 
liquidity component of corporate bond spreads remain elusive. 
Kalimipalli, Nayak and Perez (2013) studied the dynamic impact of idiosyncratic 
volatility and bond liquidity on corporate bond spreads over time and empirically 
disentangled both effects. Using an extensive data set, they found that both 
idiosyncratic volatility and liquidity are critical mainly for the distress portfolios, i.e., 
low-rated and short-term bond. For other types of bonds, only volatility matters. 
According to their results, the effects of volatility and liquidity shocks on bond 
spreads were both exacerbated during the recent financial crisis and while volatility 
shocks are more persistent and have a long-term effect, liquidity shocks are quickly 
absorbed into bonds prices. 
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Chen, Liao and Kuo (2013) explored internal liquidity risk (ILR) and financial 
bullwhip effects on corporate bond yield spreads along supply chain counterparties by 
employing American market data from year 1997 to 2008. This study finds that the 
ILRs of suppliers and customers positively affect a firms bond yield spreads and the 
effects of customers ILRs are greater. They also found a financial bullwhip effect that 
the ILR effect becomes greater upwardly along the supply chain counterparties. These 
results were robust when controlling for well-known spread determinant variables. 
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APPENDICES 
A: Price impact and bid-ask spread proxies 
Amihud: The Amihud measure is from Amihud (2002).  I calculate the daily Amihud 
measure as the average ratio of absolute return to the trade size of consecutive 
transactions during a day: 
 
Where  is the number of trades of bond i on day t, and  are the prices for 
two consecutive trades (j - 1th and jth), for bond i on day t. is the size of the jth 
trade for bond i. At least two transactions are required on a given day to calculate the 
measure. A larger Amihud measure indicates higher price impact in response to a 
given volume of trading and reflects higher illiquidity. 
Hong and Warga (HW): Based on Hong and Warga (2000) and Chacravarty and 
Sarkar (2003) measure which uses the difference between the average customer buy 
and the average customer sell price on each day to quantify transaction costs, I 
calculate the  and  measure in the following way: 
 
 
Where  is the average price of all customer buys on day t and  is the average 
price of all customer sells on day t. 
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Roundtrip cost (RTC): I measure roundtrip cost in the spirit of Feldhütter (2012). 
Feldhutter (2012) defines bond trades to be part of an IRT if two or three trades for a 
given volume occur within fifteen minutes. Such trades are likely part of a pre-
matched arrangement in which a dealer has matched a buyer and a seller.  Because the 
buy/sell indicator is not available in the TRACE data for the majority of his study 
period, he assumes the highest price to be an investor buying from a dealer, the lowest 
price to be an investor selling to a dealer and the investor roundtrip cost to be the 
highest minus the lowest price. I modify this measure using buy/sell indicators in the 
following way: First, I Identify multiple transactions for the same bond on the same 
day and same volume. Based on this definition 1,897,735 IRTs exist in my sample. 
5,518,173, transactions out of 7,988,736 are part of an IRT that form around 69% of 
total observations. These transaction groups are either S/B: include at least a customer 
buy and a customer sell transaction, D/B: Include only customer buy and interdealer 
transactions, S/D: include only customer sell and interdealer transactions, B: Include 
only customer buy transactions, S: Include only customer sell transactions, D: Include 
only interdealer transactions. Next I calculate roundtrip cost using the first three types 
In the following way: 
 
 
 
 
/
/
/
buy sell
t t
buy dealer
t t
dealer sell
t t
If transaction groupis S B
RTC If transaction groupis D B
If transaction groupis S D
p p
p p
p p
 
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Where  is the mean customer buy price (Ask) and bid is the mean customer 
sell price and  is the mean interdealer price. Finally the daily roundtrip cost for 
each bond is calculated as the average of all roundtrip costs for that bond during that 
day.  
Riskless principal trades markup (RPT) 
Riskless principal trades (RPTs) are offsetting transactions that generate a riskless 
profit (markup) for the dealer. For example, suppose that a broker-dealer buys a bond 
at the best available quoted price of 100 on behalf of a client and then sells it to the 
client at 101, a markup of 1. In these transactions, the broker-dealer typically trades 
with another dealer first (who provided the quote), and then trades with the client. 
Harris (2015) studies RPTs as a form of trade throughs when the broker fails to obtain 
the best available prices for their customers. 
We identify RPTs in a similar way to Harris (2015) and Zitzowitz (2010). First, we 
identify potential RPTs as pairs of sequentially adjacent trades of the same size for 
which one trade is a customer trade. To find these trades in TRACE data, we need to 
identify all sequences of two or more trades of equal size. Next for each sequence, we 
identify potential RPTs if one trade of two adjacent trades within a size run is a dealer 
trade with a customer, or if both trades in an adjacent pair are customer trades and the 
dealer both buys and sells. We identify the first such pair as a potential RPT, and then 
continue searching the size run for any additional pairs that do not involve trades 
already defined as being a part of a potential RPT.  Harris (2015) calls the potential 
RPTs with both trades in the pair being customer trades as “Crossing RPTs” and 
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potential RPTs with one of the trades being interdealer trade as “Normal RPTs”.  
Finally, we identify RPTs as those potential RPTs for which the time between the two 
trades in the pair is one minute or less.  
       The difference between the two trade prices in a RPT pair is the markup. For 
crossing RPT trade pairs involving dealer trades with a customer buy and a customer 
sell, we identify the markup as the difference between the dealer’s sales price to the 
buyer and the purchase price from the seller. For normal RPT pairs involving an 
interdealer trade and a sale to a customer, the markup is the customers purchase price 
minus the interdealer trade price, and vice versa for normal pars involving a dealer 
purchase from a customer. 
To better understand this new measure and to test how it behaves in our data compared 
to Harris (2015), we replicate some of the analyses in Harris (2015). Panel A of Table 
15 reports bond trades classified by position in size-run episodes. For our entire 
TRACE sample (from July 2002 to September 2014), 69.07% of all trades are in a 
size-run, 58.19% are in a size run that includes at least one potential RPT pair, and 
25.17% are in a potential RPT pair. The normal RPTs involving an interdealer trade 
are around 12 times more common than the crossing RPTs (1.93%) that involve two 
offsetting customer trades. The sample includes 2,010,910 trades in 1,005,455 
potential RPT pairs. Panel B of Table 15 shows all potential RPT pairs among all bond 
trades in our sample classified by time between trades in the pair. The reported times 
of trade (recorded  to the second) are exactly the same for 34.83% of the potential RPT 
pairs, and they are separated by one second or less for 38.34% of these pairs. It is very 
likely that the same dealers arrange these trades simultaneously. For 61.54% of all 
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potential RPT pairs, the reported time between the trades is 1 minute or less. These 
trades represent around 15.5% of all trades. All the above rates are higher in Harris 
(2015) paper. This contrast may suggest that trading in the bond market is becoming 
more electronic.  
Table 16 reports all potential RPT pairs with time between trades of one minute or less 
among all bond trades in our sample, classified by RPT markup. The markup is zero 
for 9% of the RPT pairs with trade reports within one minute of each other. The 
fraction of trades reported with zero markup declines with the length of interval 
between the two trades (In contrast Harris (2015) who finds 45.4% of RPT pairs with 
trade reports within one minute of each other have zero markup). To some extent the 
decline in zero- markup trades with time between trades also may indicate that some 
trade pairs with non-zero markups are not RPTs since the longer the interval between 
any two non-RPT trades, the greater the probability that they will be arranged at 
different prices simply due to price volatility or because different dealers arrange he 
two trades. Among the potential RPTs 0.6% (3,718) have negative markups. The 
negative markups are unlikely to be RPTs. Note that the number of trades reported 
with negative markups rises with the length of the interval between the two trades. 
Price volatility would explain this results if these trades were not RPTs. Following 
Harris (2015), we keep the negative-markup RPTs in the sample to ensure that results 
about mean markup are not upward biased (under the assumption that the distribution 
of computed markups from the non-RPTs in the set of potential RPTs is symmetric 
about zero). If indeed, the positive non-RPTs are 0.6% of all trades in the set of 
potential RPTs, the other positive mark-up RPTs represent 88% of the potential RPTs.  
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We also eliminated three types of potential RPTs (with time between trades of 1 
minute or less) from my analysis: 1. RPTs that their markups exceed -5% and 5% of 
the average of the two trade prices for because many of them may be the result of 
trading or report errors that apparently were not corrected. 2. All zero-difference price 
pairs, because they most likely are agency trades. 3. Potential RPTs with Markups 
between -10 and 10 bp, because many of these markups may be a natural consequence 
of net trade pricing without commissions. The remaining sample has 463,706 potential 
RPT pairs. The average markup in the remaining sample is 77.6 bp of price for all 
trades and 72.6 bp for trades reported within 1 second of each other. The markup rises 
after 0 second. It is 71 bp for 0 second. It jumps to 88.5 bp at 1 second and remains 
above 90 bp for 2, 3 and 4 seconds time interval. It appears that RPT trades that are 
arranged automatically have smaller markups. The larger markups at the longer 
intervals may be due to price volatility affecting any non-RPTs in this sample, or to 
dealers pricing trades that may be costlier for them to arrange, and thus take longer. 
The total value of these markups is around $141M. The markups occur on customer 
trades with a reported aggregate market trade volume of $25B. Results in Table 17 
show that retail-size trades ($100,000 or less in par value) are a greater fraction of the 
potential RPTs (92.4%) than they are of all trades (78.56% from Table 2) and IRT 
trades (80.99%). Mean markups for these trades also are larger than for institutional-
size trades at 78.8 bp versus 63.8 bp. Retail traders probably pay markups more often 
and at higher values because they are less able to negotiate trades than can institutional 
buy-side traders. Among institutional-size trades, markups and markup values are 
highest for smaller trades. These results suggest that automated trade systems might 
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most benefit retail traders and small institutional traders. The aggregate markup values 
for retail-size and institutional-size customer RPT trades are respectively $68.73M and 
$72.13M.  
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Table 15: Trade classifications by position in size-run episode and 
time elapsed  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Trade Classification Number Percentage 
All trades 7,988,836 100.00 
All trades in a size-run episode  5518173 69.07 
All trades in a size-run episode with a RPT pair  4648757 58.19 
Trades in a RPT pair 2010910 25.17 
Trades in a normal RPT pair 1856732 23.24 
Trades in a crossing RPT pair 154178 1.93 
Non-RPT trades in a size-run episode with a RPT pair 2637847 33.02 
Trades in a size-run episodes without a RPT pair 869416 10.88 
Trades not in a size-run episode 
Panel B: Elapsed time between trades in the RPT pair         
2,470,663 30.93 
All RPT pairs 1005,455 100.00 
≤1 minute (potential RPT) 618,731 61.54 
≤1 Second (potential electronic RPT) 385,501 38.34 
0s 350,204 34.83 
1s 35,297 3.51 
2s 27,480 2.73 
3s 19,404 1.93 
4s 14,846 1.48 
5s 15,830 1.57 
6 to 10s 37,525 3.73 
11 to 20s 33,057 3.29 
21 to 60s  85,088 8.46 
1 to 5 min 66,229 6.59 
5+ min 320,495 31.88 
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      Table16: Potential RPT pairs with time between trades of one minute or less. Col% indicates column percentage and R.% 
 
 
 
 
 
Elapsed time between 
trades in the RPT pair         
All RPT pairs 
RPT markup 
Negative Zero Positive 
N Percent N Col% R% N Col% R% N Col% R.% 
≤1 minute (potential RPT) 618,731 100.0 3,718 100.0 0.6 55,971 100.0 9.0 559,042 100.0 90.4 
≤1 Second  
(potential electronic RPT) 
385,501 62.3 1,103 29.7 0.3 32,867 58.7 8.5 351,531 62.9 91.2 
0s 350,204 56.6 952 25.6 0.3 29,528 52.8 8.4 319,724 57.2 91.3 
1s 35,297 5.7 151 4.1 0.4 3,339 6.0 9.5 31,807 5.7 90.1 
2s 27,480 4.4 102 2.7 0.4 1,685 3.0 6.1 25,693 4.6 93.5 
3s 19,404 3.1 69 1.9 0.4 1,335 2.4 6.9 18,000 3.2 92.8 
4s 14,846 2.4 62 1.7 0.4 1,020 1.8 6.9 13,764 2.5 92.7 
5s 15,830 2.6 54 1.5 0.3 990 1.8 6.3 14,786 2.6 93.4 
6 to 10s 37,525 6.1 325 8.7 0.9 3,371 6.0 9.0 33,829 6.1 90.2 
11 to 20s 33,057 5.3 443 11.9 1.3 4,193 7.5 12.7 28,421 5.1 86.0 
21 to 60s  85,088 13.8 1,560 42.0 1.8 10,510 18.8 12.4 73,018 13.1 85.8 
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                         Table17: Total markup values for potential RPT pairs. 
 
 
 
 
       
      
Elapsed time between trades in the RPT 
pair         
N Mean RPT 
markup (bp) 
Mean Markup 
value ($) 
Total Markup 
value ($M) 
Total dollar trade 
volume ($B) 
      
≤1 minute (potential RPT) 463,706 77.6 300 140.85 25 
≤1 Second (potential electronic RPT) 290,262 72.6 230 66.48 11 
0s 262,849 71.0 220 59.03 9.7 
1s 27,413 88.5 270 744 1 
2s 23,011 90.3 260 613 0.8 
3s 16,046 91.5 250 403 0.6 
4s 11,944 91.2 270 327 0.5 
5s 11,269 78.3 230 264 0.4 
6 to 10s 26,500 78.6 330 872 1.71 
11 to 20s 23,648 84.7 610 1437 2.91 
21 to 60s  61,026 86.9 570 3519 7.54 
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B: Tobit regressions for liquidity measures 
Table 18: Regressions for liquidity proxies  
This table repeats the analysis in Table 4 using Tobit regression model for the liquidity proxies with left-censored 
distributions including Amihud, RTC, HW,RPT and Zero and OLS regression for Log (#Trades) and Log (Vol.). 
Aa/AA,…, C are dummy variables equal to one if  Moody’s rating class for the bond is Aa (Aa or Aa2 or Aa3),…C, 
and zero otherwise. If the bond is not rated by Moody’s, S&P rating is used. Control variables are defined both in 
Table 2 and the text. Utility is a dummy variable equal to one, if the issuer belongs to utility industry group and zero 
otherwise. Finance is a dummy variable equal to one if the issuer is a financial firm and zero otherwise. For Tobit 
models, z-statistics are calculated using robust standard errors. For OLS regressions, t-statistics are calculated using 
firm level clustered robust standard errors. 
 
 
 Price impact  Bid-ask spread   Trading activity 
Amihud RTC HW RPT Log(#Trades) Log(Vol.) Zero 
Rating dummies: 
Aa/AA -0.06***  -0.06*** -0.17*** 0.01  -0.01 0.05 -2.11*** 
A -0.03**  -0.01 -0.09*** 0.05***  0.01 0.07 -2.74*** 
Baa/BBB 0.03**  0.08*** 0.07*** 0.12***  0.02 0.10 -2.55*** 
Ba/BB 0.10***  0.15*** 0.23*** 0.18***  0.50*** 0.81*** -13.63*** 
B 0.13***  0.12*** 0.17*** 0.11***  0.44*** 0.75*** -11.70*** 
Caa/CCC 0.19***  0.08*** 0.23*** 0.13***  0.88*** 1.20*** -20.78*** 
Ca/CC/C 0.51***  -0.12*** -0.07* -0.06***  0.31** 0.80*** -7.64*** 
Bond/firm controls: 
Trade size 0.00***  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
% Inst. trades -0.98***  -0.65*** -1.97*** -0.34***  -0.94*** 3.45*** 22.64*** 
Maturity 0.02***  0.02*** 0.06*** 0.02***  -0.01*** -0.01*** 0.27*** 
Coupon 0.03***  0.05*** 0.06*** 0.02***  -0.10*** -0.14*** 2.86*** 
Age 0.00**  0.00*** 0.01*** -0.01***  0.00 -0.03*** -0.12*** 
Issue size 0.07***  0.05*** -0.09*** 0.07***  1.70*** 2.44*** -61.36*** 
Coupon freq. 0.01***  0.01*** 0.00 0.01*  -0.13*** -0.22*** 2.69*** 
# Issuer bonds 0.00***  0.00 0.00*** 0.00***  0.00 0.00 -0.10*** 
Utility 0.09***  0.09*** 0.03 -0.04***  -0.45*** -0.69*** 9.39*** 
Finance 0.06***  0.00 0.04*** -0.01  0.13*** 0.17*** -3.29*** 
Intercept 0.62***  0.51*** 1.50*** 0.49***  3.80*** 0.94*** 39.87*** 
Year fixed 
effect 
Y  Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
# Bonds 3,478  3,379 3,082 2,450  3,478 3,478 3,478 
Obs 129,573  120,660 93,977 61,567  129,573 129,573 129,573 
Left-censored  2,442  5288 3668 512  0 0 12285 
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           Table 19: Piecewise regressions. 
This table repeats the analysis in Table 5 using Tobit regression model for the liquidity proxies with left-censored distributions including 
Amihud, RTC, HW,RPT and Zero and OLS regression for Log (#Trades) and Log (Vol.). The regression model is in the following form:   
                             
Rating is the numerical translation of Moody’s rating: 1=Aaa, 21=C. Junk is a dummy variable equal to one if the Moody’s rating for the bond 
is between 11=Ba to 19=Caa and equal to zero if the rating for the bond is investment grade.  denotes the year fixed effect.  , 
denotes the matrix of control variables. For Tobit models, z-statistics are calculated using robust standard errors. For OLS regressions, t-
statistics are calculated using firm level clustered robust standard errors. 
*indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
  Price impact  Bid-ask spread   Trading activity  
Amihud RTC HW RPT Log(#Trades) Log(Vol.) Zero 
Rating ( )  0.02***  0.01*** 0.02*** 0.01***  0.02** 0.03*** -0.16 
  (23.59)  (10.00) (10.67) (8.26)  (2.53) (3.97) (-1.01) 
Junk ( )  -0.03***  0.09*** 0.16*** 0.09***  0.31*** 0.46*** -7.05*** 
  (-2.83)  (7.43) (6.77) (7.52)  (3.71) (3.78) (-3.32) 
Junk (Rating-11)( )  -0.00  -0.01*** -0.01* -0.02***  0.04* 0.02 -0.75 
  (-1.10)  (-3.34) (-1.84) (-5.84)  (1.73) (0.56) (-1.44) 
Intercept ( )  0.46***  0.45*** 1.31*** 0.50***  3.72*** 0.8*** 33.06*** 
  (27.01)  (28.16) (39.25) (26.84)  (29.08) (4.45) (10.06) 
Controls  Y  Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Year fixed effect  Y  Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
# Bonds  3,478  3,379 3,082 2,450  3,478 3,478 3,478 
Obs  129,573  120,660 93,977 61,567  129,573 129,573 129,573 
Left-censored   2,442  5288 3668 512  0 0 12285 
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Table 20: Regressions for liquidity proxies during three sub-periods 
This table repeats the analysis in Table 6 using Tobit regression model for the liquidity proxies with left-
censored distributions including Amihud, RTC, HW,RPT and Zero and OLS regression for Log (#Trades) 
and Log (Vol.). 
Pre-crisis is the sample period from Jul. 2002 to Nov. 2007, crisis is the period from Dec. 2007 to 
June 2009, post-crisis is the period from July 2009 to Sep.2014. Dependent variables, rating 
dummies and control variables are similar to Table 4. To save space, the coefficients for control 
variables are not reported. For Tobit models, z-statistics are calculated using robust standard errors.  
 
 
 
 
  Price 
impact 
 Bid-ask spread   Trading activity  
Amihud RTC HW RPT Log(#Trades) Log(Vol.) Zero 
Panel A: Pre-crisis period 
Aa/AA  -0.04***  -0.05** -0.09*** 0.01  0.09 0.19 -3.75*** 
A  -0.04***  -0.02 -0.07*** 0.03**  0.15* 0.28** -4.63*** 
Baa/BBB  0.01  0.07*** 0.10*** 0.09***  0.07 0.23* -1.31*** 
Ba/BB  0.13***  0.24*** 0.35*** 0.26***  0.50*** 0.82*** -11.8*** 
B  0.12***  0.24*** 0.37*** 0.22***  0.48*** 0.84*** -10.8*** 
Caa/CCC  0.12***  0.25*** 0.42*** 0.20***  1.12*** 1.44*** -22.1*** 
Ca/CC/C  0.59***  -0.01 0.14*** 0.02  0.58*** 1.07*** -10.6*** 
Intercept  0.23***  0.28 0.75*** 0.39***  3.31*** 0.36* 47.3*** 
# Bonds  3,041  2,946 2,708 2,042  3,041 3,041 3,041 
Obs  80,033  72,639 57,788 29,777  80,033 80,033 80,033 
Left-censored  2335  4141 3028 361  0 0 5229 
Panel B: Crisis period 
Aa/AA  -0.09**  -0.1*** -0.10 0.01  -0.10 -0.08 2.31* 
A  0.07*  0.04 0.21*** 0.10***  0.15 0.25 -4.22*** 
Baa/BBB  0.19***  0.07** 0.49*** 0.10***  0.10 0.27 -3.05** 
Ba/BB  0.26***  -0.15*** 0.37*** 0.02  0.34* 0.65** -11.2*** 
B  0.30***  -0.13*** -0.21* 0.03  0.14 0.40 -6.96*** 
Caa/CCC  0.59***  -0.22*** 0.04 -0.14***  0.70*** 1.40*** -20.6*** 
Ca/CC/C  0.90***  -0.23*** -0.22 -0.17***  0.37 0.88** -11.9*** 
Intercept  0.31***  0.12** 1.07*** 0.23***  3.33*** 0.08 59.19** 
# Bonds  1,134  1,125 1,012 901  1,134 1,134 1,134 
Obs  12,772  12,351 9,133 7,221  12,772 12,772 12,772 
Left-censored  50  422 192 27  0 0 1383 
Panel C: Post-crisis period 
Aa/AA  -0.11  -0.06** -0.6*** -0.03  0.31 0.65 -8.55*** 
A  -0.11  -0.02 -0.6*** 0.00  0.29 0.64 -8.62*** 
Baa/BBB  -0.09  0.05 -0.5*** 0.06  0.39 0.72 -12.2*** 
Ba/BB  -0.08  0.01 -0.5*** 0.06*  1.04*** 1.73*** -26.3*** 
B  -0.05  -0.07* -0.6*** -0.06  0.89*** 1.53*** -21.4*** 
Caa/CCC  0.01  -0.09** -0.7*** 0.01  0.86** 1.33** -21.7*** 
Ca/CC/C  0.26***  -0.21*** -0.7*** -0.12***  0.55 1.48*** -14.1*** 
Left-censored  0.59***  0.4*** 2.0*** 0.36***  3.48*** 0.06 49.7*** 
# Bonds  1,203  1,192 1,068 1,029  1,203 1,203 1,203 
Obs  36,768  35,670 27,056 24,569  36,768 36,768 36,768 
Left-censored  57  725 448 124  0 0 5673 
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                  C: AIC and BIC for Autoregressive Markov switching models 
 
       Table 21: AIC and BIC for Autoregressive Markov switching models 
        Blank spaces demonstrate the models for which EM algorithm do not converge 
 
Panel A: Aggregate market time series 
# of regimes AR(1)  AR(2) 
2 3 4 2 3 4 
Amihud  
Switching  AR 
coefs 
AIC -526.95 - -  -523.51 -542.09 - 
BIC -495.08 - -  -475.79 -470.51 - 
Non-switching  
AR ceofs 
AIC -520.74 - -  -519.82 -527.33 - 
BIC -496.84 - -  -488.01 -487.56 - 
RTC 
Switching  AR 
coefs 
AIC -614.74 - -  -622.25 -626.67 - 
BIC -582.87 - -  -574.53 -555.09 - 
Non-switching  
AR ceofs 
AIC - -624.53 -632.33  -621.96 -627.05 -630.14 
BIC - -592.66 -592.50  -590.15 -587.28 -582.42 
HW     
Switching  AR 
coefs 
AIC -339.92 -354.81 -365.63  -346.52 - -369.81 
BIC -308.05 -307.00 -301.89  -298.80 - -274.37 
Non-switching  
AR ceofs 
AIC -331.64 -   -341.43  -349.17 - - 
BIC -307.74 - -301.59  -317.35 - - 
RPT 
Switching  AR 
coefs 
AIC -581.1486 - -  -618.19 - - 
BIC -549.2797 - -  -570.47 - - 
Non-switching  
AR ceofs 
AIC -582.9162 -598.2856 -  -615.88 -626.55 - 
BIC -559.0146 -566.4168 -  -584.07 -586.78 - 
#Trades 
Switching  AR 
coefs 
AIC 852.44 830.86 827.34  813.04 816.68 815.90 
BIC 884.30 878.67 891.08  860.76 888.26 911.34 
Non-switching  
AR ceofs 
AIC 829.26 - -  810.14 - - 
BIC 853.16 - -  841.96 - - 
Volume 
Switching  AR 
coefs 
AIC 766.73 748.50 737.19  742.24 728.82   714.61 
BIC 798.60 796.31 800.92  789.96 800.40 810.05 
Non-switching  
AR ceofs 
AIC -   774.08 -    763.04 744.6 - 
BIC - 805.95 -  794.86 784.37 - 
Zero 
Switching  AR 
coefs 
AIC 481.23 - -  480.323 - - 
BIC 513.09 - -  528.0438 - - 
Non-switching  
AR ceofs 
AIC 521.15 - 515.28  522.265 - - 
BIC 545.05 - 555.12  554.078 - - 
% RPT Trades 
Switching  AR 
coefs 
AIC 408.44 - -  393.58 391.34 388.70 
BIC 440.31 - -  441.3 462.92 484.15 
Non-switching  
AR ceofs 
AIC      416.41 - -    407.89 - - 
BIC 440.31 - -  439.71 - - 
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         Table 21 (continued): AIC and BIC for Autoregressive Markov switching model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           
      
 
 
Panel A (continued): Aggregate market time series 
# of regimes AR(1)  AR(2) 
2 3 4 2 3 4 
% Inter dealer trades 
Switching  AR 
coefs 
AIC 437.24 428.82 -  428.32 420.37 - 
BIC 469.11 476.63 -  476.03 491.96 - 
Non-switching  
AR ceofs 
AIC 445.26 438.37 426.37  432.07 429.37 - 
BIC 469.16 470.24 466.21  463.88 469.14 - 
% Block volume trades 
Switching  AR 
coefs 
AIC 462.36 449.45 -    452.95 443.41 - 
BIC 494.23 497.25 -  500.67 514.99 - 
Non-switching  
AR ceofs 
AIC 462.17 - -  451.83 - - 
BIC 486.07 - -  483.64 - - 
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            Table 21 (continued): AIC and BIC for Autoregressive Markov switching models 
 
          Panel B: IG - HY time series 
# of regimes AR(1)  AR(2) 
2 3 4 2 3 4 
Amihud  
Switching  AR 
coefs 
AIC -310.97 - -  -307.82 - - 
BIC -279.11 - -  -260.10 - - 
Non-switching  
AR ceofs 
AIC -308.86 - -  -308.40 - - 
BIC -284.96 - -  -276.59 - - 
RTC 
Switching  AR 
coefs 
AIC -316.81 -325.48 -  -332.95 - - 
BIC -284.94 -277.68 -  -285.23 - - 
Non-switching  
AR ceofs 
AIC -318.76 - -  -329.44 -335.78 - 
BIC -294.86 - -  -297.63 -296.01 - 
HW     
Switching  AR 
coefs 
AIC -120.25 - -  -142.93 - - 
BIC -88.39 - -  -95.211 - - 
Non-switching  
AR ceofs 
AIC -119.21 - -  -142.43 - - 
BIC -95.31 - -  -110.62 - - 
RPT 
Switching  AR 
coefs 
AIC -318.88 - -  -330.30 - - 
BIC -287.01 - -  -282.58 - - 
Non-switching  
AR ceofs 
AIC -309.85 - -  -326.73 -330.38 - 
BIC -285.94 - -  -294.91 -290.61 - 
#Trades 
Switching  AR 
coefs 
AIC 993.91 - -  986.81 - - 
BIC 1025.78 - -  1034.53 - - 
Non-switching  
AR ceofs 
AIC 996.98 - -  986.40 - - 
BIC 1020.88 - -  1018.21 - - 
Volume 
Switching  AR 
coefs 
AIC 874.10 - -    852.57 - - 
BIC 905.97 - -  900.29 - - 
Non-switching  
AR ceofs 
AIC 877.76 - -  856.30 852.48 - 
BIC 901.66 - -  888.11 892.25 - 
Zero 
Switching  AR 
coefs 
AIC 531.11 513.55 -  508.35 - - 
BIC 562.98 561.35 -  556.07 - - 
Non-switching  
AR ceofs 
AIC 528.96 528.68 -  527.02 529.06 530.99 
BIC 552.87 560.55 -  558.84 568.82 578.71 
% RPT Trades 
Switching  AR 
coefs 
AIC 646.31 642.69 -  636.26 628.98 - 
BIC 678.18 690.50 --  683.98 700.57 - 
Non-switching  
AR ceofs 
AIC 670.56    645.22   
B 
ICIIIC 
694.46    677.04   
